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ABSTRACT 
In the second decade of the 21st century, the Indo-Pacific region has been witness 
to increasingly coercive activities by China in the maritime domain. These activities have 
fundamentally challenged the traditional security architecture, proving to be adverse to 
the broader interests of nations in the region. However, countering Chinese provocations 
at sea has proven difficult, as Beijing has effectively manipulated the space between 
peace and war. That space is commonly referred to as the “gray zone” and is a space in 
which competitive interactions are managed using state and non-state actors with the 
ultimate goal of altering the status quo without provoking war. China has demonstrated 
that gray zone competition in the maritime domain can be a successful strategy with 
which to achieve its goal: expanding its control of the South China Sea. A critical 
element in China’s gray zone maritime campaign is the operationalization of its fishing 
fleet into maritime militias. The Chinese maritime militias have played a prominent 
role in maritime disputes since 2009 and are responsible for some of the most 
dangerous interactions at sea. Because they are an abundant array of simple tactical 
units with strategic effect, it is essential that policymakers and security practitioners 
understand the impact that these units can have on the region’s long-term security. 
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I. CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIAS: A GRAY ZONE FORCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the armed forces of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The PLA comprises five 
branches: Ground Force (PLAGF), Navy (PLAN), Air Force (PLAAF), and the recently 
added Rocket Force (PLARF) and Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). In addition to those 
branches, a significant element of China’s armed forces includes the mass organization of 
civilians into militia units. Of particular interest is the recent increase in the use of maritime 
militias, especially within gray zone conflict, where activities can be both competitive and 
coercive but fall below the threshold for war. Critical to this thesis will be identifying the 
principle drivers that have prompted the CCP and PLA to employ a maritime militia force 
that can potentially influence future warfighting and undermine the United States’ 
competitive advantage within the Pacific Theater. This research should, in turn, answer the 
question: How does China’s maritime militias’ participating in gray zone conflict impact 
international relations? 
Understanding the PRC’s strategic goals and policy decisions informs why Beijing 
would use maritime militias in combination with its military. It can be argued that almost 
all nations’ military strategies are a reflection of the governing parties’ political aims, and, 
therefore, that military strategy is a nation’s strategy to employ force. The interrelationship 
between policy and strategy is a critical aspect to consider when analyzing any nation. That 
is to say that while the PLA is the armed forces of China, it is more precisely the armed 
forces of the Chinese Communist Party. This distinction is important because it may 
produce insights into the PRC’s strategic direction that might otherwise go unobserved. 
The strategic goals of the PRC include the maintenance of domestic stability, prevention 
of Taiwanese secession, border defense, the defense of China’s maritime claims and 
economic interests, and the safeguard of Chinese interests and citizens abroad.1 
1 Timothy R. Heath, Kristen Gunness, and Cortez A. Cooper, The PLA and China’s Rejuvenation: 
National Security and Military Strategies, Deterrence Concepts, and Combat Capabilities, RR-1402-OSD 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 3–7. 
2 
Critical in the development of a response to the research question is understanding 
Chinese political and military strategy, defining what gray zone conflict is, and how 
maritime militias occupy that zone. This inquiry raises two sub-questions. First, what 
promotes China’s use of maritime militias in operations that support strategic objectives? 
Second, how does China use the maritime militias to prevent an escalation of regional 
conflict? Answering the sub-questions requires a brief historical review of the PLA from 
the onset of the Chinese revolution through to present day. Furthermore, an analysis of 
Chinese political and military strategies will provide an ideological as well as an 
institutional framework with which to characterize maritime militias in the hierarchy. 
Analyzing gray zone conflict, reviewing Chinese strategy, and examining tactical case 
studies identifies various historical, regional, and international factors that have shaped the 
CCP’s and PLA’s decision to use maritime militias. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE
This research is critical for three reasons. First, it supports the United States
National Security Strategy (NSS), specifically in the areas of the South China Sea (SCS) 
and East China Sea (ECS). China’s trajectory has put it on a competitive path with the 
United States and has substantially affected the international community and China’s 
regional neighbors. The most recent NSS indicates that stability in the Pacific is of 
paramount concern and contends that “China … want[s] to shape a world antithetical to 
U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific 
region…and reorder the region in its favor.”2 One of the most important areas where 
Beijing is seeking to displace the United States is in the SCS and ECS. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) explains the contentious issues surrounding the South and East China Seas 
by asserting that “China’s expansive interpretation of jurisdictional authority beyond 
territorial seas and airspace causes friction with U.S. forces and treaty allies operating in 
2 Donald Trump, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: 
White House, December 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-
12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 25.
3 
international waters and airspace in the region and raises the risk of inadvertent crisis.”3  
More specifically, China uses gray zones in these regions to impose its authority and 
challenge U.S. forces. 
Second, this thesis elucidates the security concerns of other regional actors and 
partners. Many regional nations view the PRC as a clear and present danger due to China’s 
assertive actions throughout the region, but more specifically within the maritime domain. 
Beijing’s public advocation for maritime territorial sovereignty and resurgence of militia 
mobilization stands to threaten individual states and peoples, as well as the region. China 
has challenged the territorial sovereignty of Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, often in direct contradiction with international law. The 
NSS asserts that “sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong commitment 
and close cooperation with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify U.S. 
power and extend U.S. influence.”4 Partner nation cooperation and coordination will be 
critical in “resisting authoritarian trends, contesting radical ideologies, and deterring 
aggression,” especially those activities that occur below the level of war.5 Understanding 
political aims and mechanisms that inhibit unintended escalation is one of the most 
significant factors in developing strategies with our allies to counter near-peer competition 
and gray zone competition. 
Third, Chinese activities occurring within the gray zone significantly diminish the 
capacities of both the United States and regional partners to compete with growing Chinese 
influence. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dunford recently remarked that 
the term itself—gray zone—should carry with it a greater significance. General Dunford 
explained, “we are talking about … a competition with an adversary that has a military 
dimension, but the adversary knows exactly what the threshold is for us to take decisive 
3 Department of Defense, “The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National 
Security Objectives in a Changing Environment” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 27, 
2015), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-
08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF, 14. 
4 Trump, National Security Strategy, 45. 
5 Trump, National Security Strategy, 45. 
4 
military action. So, they operate below that level.”6  For General Dunford, this is “one of 
the most significant challenges” that the U.S. military and DoD are facing today.7  
Extrapolating from General Dunford’s comments, one can argue that gray zone 
competition is one of the most noteworthy problems facing the international community. 
A clear assessment of factors that have contributed to China’s development of 
maritime militias as an operationalized gray zone force contributes significantly to creating 
counter-strategies that will mitigate China’s regional and global hegemonic goals. 
Moreover, this thesis provides a framework with which military leaders and policymakers 
can more accurately analyze and classify instances of conflict at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Chinese Strategy
a. Revolution to Asymmetric Exploitation
Early CCP and PLA strategies were dominated by mobile guerrilla tactics that 
sought to identify weaknesses in conventional forces, thus capitalizing on asymmetric 
vulnerabilities. This type of warfare addresses a weakness of the unconventional forces 
regarding capabilities, manpower, and equipment. The weakness in force coupled with the 
prolonged nature of unconventional warfare can lead to institutional biases that favor more 
defensive capabilities over offensive proficiencies when combatting potential threats. Paul 
H.B. Godwin asserts “China’s defense strategies and policies have focused primarily on 
preparing the PLA for a possible confrontation with vastly superior adversaries.”8 
Therefore, strategy was developed from a self-imposed position of subordination and 
weakness. Godwin further explains, “much of the continuity found in China’s military 
6 Joseph Dunford, “Meeting Today’s Global Security Challenges with General Joseph F. Dunford,” 
March 29, 2016, http://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/tabid/3890/Article/707418/gen-dunfords-remarks-
and-qa-at-the-center-for-strategic-and-international-studi.aspx. 
7 Dunford, “Meeting.” 
8 Paul H. B. Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949–1999,” Chinese 
Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949, eds. Mark A. Ryan, David Michael Finkelstein, and Michael 
A. McDevitt, (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 23.
5 
doctrine, strategy, and concepts of operations … is to be found in the enduring requirement 
to defeat superior opponents.”9 Thus, China’s early post-1949 strategy grew from a 
presumed position of weakness, maintaining a primarily defensive posture due to the 
“inferiority in the material means of war.”10 
However, since 1988 the CCP and PLA have recognized shifts in international 
warfare necessitating a doctrinal alteration from defensive to offensive. The defensive to 
offensive paradigm transference was primarily a result of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1991. 
CCP and PLA observed the importance of having a highly mobile and technologically 
capable force. The focus was not on deterring or countering an invasion but rather 
“countering multiple forms of conflicts from different adversaries.”11 Taylor Fravel asserts 
that by 1993, the “PLA rewrote its operational doctrine around joint operations, … 
reorganized through two downsizings to increase effectiveness … [and] issued a new army-
wide training program.”12 The massive institutional changes in 1993 formed the basis of 
an offensive strategy that continues to evolve to this day and was a key element in the 2014 
strategy, known as “winning informationalized local wars.”13 
According to Fravel, the most recent changes in 2004 and 2014 are considered to 
be minor and are characterized as refinements. However, one significant implication is that 
the two minor shifts indicate a continued commitment to offensive capabilities as they are 
primarily considered refinements of the 1993 strategy. In both the 2004 and 2014 strategies, 
the PLA advanced joint operations to integrated joint operations. The distinction, which 
may appear benign, is an incredibly significant evolution in military capability and 
doctrine. Integrated joint operations in the maritime domain employ units across multiple 
lines of operations and is referred to by Chinese strategists as the echelon defense system. 
Ryan Martinson asserts, “echelon defense is an approach for using sea power to defend and 
                                                 
9 Godwin, “Change and Continuity,” 23. 
10 Godwin, “Change and Continuity,” 23.  
11 M. Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China’s Changes in Military 
Strategy,” International Security 42, no. 3 (2017): 73–74. 
12 Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare,” 74.  
13 Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare,” 51. 
6 
advance China’s maritime claims. It employs a division of labor between China’s two 
primary sea services, leveraging the particular advantages of each.”14 The definition 
provided in Martinson’s work refers to China’s navy and coast guard; however, the 
maritime militias have proven to be a critical component of the echelon defense strategy. 
The echelon strategy is employed by Beijing in order to exploit two asymmetries 
in the maritime domain. This includes China’s overwhelming military superiority of 
regional neighbors and a greater steadfastness to the cause of maritime sovereignty against 
the United States and Japan. Martinson stresses that “China’s echelon defense approach 
exploits these two asymmetries while remaining within the constraints of Chinese grand 
strategy, what PRC propagandists call ‘peaceful development.’  Beijing desires to leverage 
its growing power to alter the status quo in its favor.”15 The echelon defense strategy 
asymmetric exploitations are an example of a gray zone tactic. When considering the 
echelon defense approach, it is important to understand it as a nested tactic in China’s 
broader Three Warfares strategy. 
The Three Warfares—Psychological, Media, Legal—is Beijing’s systematization 
of national soft-power instruments designed to achieve political aims short of war; as such, 
it provides an additional conceptual framework within which China makes use of gray zone 
tactics. Sangkuk Lee contends that “the Three Warfares at a national strategic level aim to 
protect (or expand) national interests … [and] the military strategic Three Warfares refer 
to activities for implementing military strategy and for preventing … wars.”16 The Three 
Warfares carries with it specific implications in both the strategic and operational maritime 
domain, specifically with regards to the Law of the Sea and the employment of paramilitary 
forces. James Goldrick asserts, “in utilizing the ‘Three Warfares’ in the maritime domain, 
China would either be attempting to limit or confine American naval operations to achieve 
direct strategic and operational effects, or to achieve an advantage in the court of world 
                                                 
14 Ryan D. Martinson, Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy, 
China Maritime Study, No. 15 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2018),  27. 
15 Martinson, Echelon Defense, 3. 
16 Sangkuk Lee, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’: Origins, Applications, and Organizations,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 37, no. 2 (February 23, 2014): 204, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.870071 
7 
opinion, both popular and expert.”17 The “Three Warfares” is an important element of the 
Chinese stratagem that seeks to undermine the adversary’s resolve. 
b. Territorial Sovereignty & Maritime Strategy 
China’s position has remained consistent in regard to the East and South China Seas 
going back several decades; however, Chinese policies and activities have grown more 
intense and coercive since 2008, in part due to the global financial crisis. Fundamentally, 
the Chinese believe that the contested areas of the maritime domain are irrefutably 
extensions of their territorial sovereignty, which, they argue, is supported by international 
law. Ryan Martinson asserts that “Chinese leaders believe that the United Nations 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entitles them to jurisdictional rights over 
three million square kilometers of maritime space, often referred to as China’s ‘blue 
national territory.’”18 Furthermore,  Martinson explains, “China uses sea power to defend 
and advance its position in two major types of maritime disputes,” territorial rights or 
maritime rights.19 Central to defending the “blue national territory” has been the PLA 
Navy, Coast Guard, and, more recently, the maritime militias. 
Scholars mostly agree that China’s maritime strategy reflects an increasing 
emphasis on the creation of a blue water force capable of global power projection. This 
idea is reinforced by Katherine Morton, who explains that “China’s maritime renaissance 
has been a long time in the making—shaped by centuries-long internal struggles over its 
national identity as a continental power.”20 China’s naval modernization ultimately serves 
multiple lines of strategic effort and is not limited to traditional naval force generation. As 
Martinson explains, Chinese leaders have recognized that increasing China’s share of the 
maritime commons increases their strategic decision-making space and reduces the threat 
                                                 
17 James Goldrick, “The Three Warfares in the Maritime Domain: A Look Ahead,” in China: The 
Three Warfares, ed. Stefan Halper (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2013), 300–314. 
18 Martinson, Echelon Defense, 27. 
19 Martinson, Echelon Defense, 4–6. 
20 Katherine Morton, “China’s Ambition in the South China Sea: Is a Legitimate Maritime Order 
Possible?,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 1, 2016): 909–40, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2346.12658, 931. 
8 
posed by the United States. Therefore, “controlling island frontiers hundreds of miles from 
the mainland coast and the waters between them offers a means to alleviate this 
vulnerability.”21 An important aspect of naval modernization includes the evolution of 
maritime militias constituted from China’s vast civilian fishing fleet. Hongzhou Zhang 
stresses, “there is no denial that the Chinese government considers a strong fishing fleet as 
integral to sea power and it has strengthened the fishermen’s capacity for protecting the 
country’s maritime interest in disputed waters.”22 Maritime modernization and 
mobilization efforts in China can be considered a whole-of-government process, 
employing non-traditional sectors in national security concerned with maritime rights and 
sovereignty. 
2. Gray Zone Conflict 
a. Historic Warfare 
The succeeding section acknowledges the historical ubiquity of gray zone conflict 
and the contemporary trend to more thoroughly understand its implications in international 
relations. Gray zone conflict is not inherently a new form of warfare. Although the term 
gray zone is more etymologically recent, the concept is as old as civilization. History is 
replete with examples of gray zone conflict, from the Peloponnesian war to the Napoleonic 
era, WW II, the Vietnam War, the continuing global war on terrorism, and, more recently, 
to the Russian incursion into Crimea. Van Jackson asserts that “defense analysts and 
policymakers now refer routinely to the challenges of operating in a ‘gray zone’ of conflict, 
which coincides with recent scholarly efforts to analyze more rigorously conflicts short of 
traditional coercion or war.”23 As a concept and framework, gray zone conflict is an 
invaluable model by which to understand state actions that attempt to manage escalation in 
an effort to achieve a political aim short of war.  
                                                 
21 Martinson, Echelon Defense, 8. 
22 Hongzhou Zhang, “Chinese Fishermen in Disputed Waters: Not Quite a ‘People’s War,’” Marine 
Policy 68 (June 2016): 67, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.018. 
23 Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competition: Gray Zone, Redlines, and Conflicts before War,” 
Naval War College Review; Washington 70, no. 3 (June 22, 2017):  39. 
9 
b. Gray Zone Defined 
Given the recent appearance of the term gray zone, the academic community has 
not settled on one definition. Van Jackson asserts that the “broadest and most consistent 
use of the term seems to describe what amounts to a realpolitik state of competition short 
of war.”24 A recently published report by the U.S. State Department holds that “perhaps 
the most widely used definition of gray zone conflict is that established by the U.S. Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM): gray zone challenges are defined as competitive 
interaction among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war 
and peace duality.”25 
Furthermore, in a recent study released by Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, the authors offer the definition that “a gray zone strategy [is] an effort or series of 
efforts beyond steady-state deterrence and assurance that attempts to achieve one’s security 
objectives without resort to direct and sizeable use of force. In engaging in a gray zone 
strategy, an actor seeks to avoid crossing a threshold that results in war.”26 Ultimately, the 
most salient point of the definitions is that gray zone competition and coercion are an 
amalgamation of strategies that attempt to remain below the inception point of war. 
Michael Mazaar argues that “gray zone strategies pursue political objectives through 
calculated and integrated campaigns to achieve specific and often quite ambitious 
goals…but they employ mostly non-military or non-kinetic tools.”27 
c. Gray Zone Characteristics 
Three key features are identified in the literature concerning gray zone conflict. 
Michael Mazarr contends that states’ “dependence on global trade and markets, along with 
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the fear of escalation and other constraints, make them anxious to achieve their goals with 
techniques short of major conflict—more gradual, less violent, and less obvious.”28 The 
characteristics identified by Mazarr are described in Michael Green’s study as “asymmetry, 
ambiguity, and incrementalism.”29 Green asserts that states will employ strategies that use 
all of the aforementioned characteristics, or a combination of them, to achieve their goals. 
SOCOM imputes gray zone conflict with the same qualities asserted by Green and Mazaar. 
SOCOM asserts that the gray zone is “characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the 
conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal 
frameworks.”30 Asymmetric tactics can be employed across the spectrum of national 
instruments of power—diplomacy, information, military, and economy. Often times, states 
employ these instruments in coordination to amplify the coercive effects in an attempt to 
compel an adversary to alter decision-making. Ambiguity, like asymmetry, can take 
advantage of various institutional and psychological factors that can aggravate and 
ultimately undermine response mechanisms of competing states. Ambiguity presents 
adversaries with situations that do not conform to standard operating procedures (as 
defined and practiced by large organizations such as militaries and law enforcement) and 
forces them to reconsider standard courses of action. The characteristics combined foster 
environments in which a belligerent state can gradually alter the status quo. Thus, an 
incremental approach is less likely to catapult any dispute or conflict past the threshold that 
would otherwise result in war. These factors are what make gray zone conflict difficult to 
counter but also incredibly advantageous to revisionist states attempting to manage 
escalation and reduce risk. 
d. People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militias 
This last section recognizes China’s continued military modernization efforts in the 
previous three decades. The broad scholarly consensus is that China has been in the process 
of military modernization for more than 25 years. Modernization efforts have primarily 
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come as a result of China’s observations concerning Desert Storm in 1991, the subsequent 
strategy shift to one of “winning local wars under conditions of informatization,” and the 
Third Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996.31 These events have ultimately led the Chinese to 
create one of the largest naval forces in the world. However, Michael Green asserts that 
policymakers and national security professionals have primarily been myopic, concerning 
themselves solely with China’s high-end capabilities. Green argues that “China’s low-level 
coercion and nonmilitary capabilities are increasingly important as Beijing employs 
paramilitary forces to gradually alter the status quo.”32 Within the maritime domain, 
China’s paramilitary forces take the form of maritime militias. 
The maritime militias serve as what is commonly referred to as China’s “Third Sea 
Force.” Andrew Erickson briefly explains China’s military composition and PLA’s three 
branches, each with a naval component: 
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contains the PLA Navy (PLAN); the 
People’s Armed Police, which increasingly leads China’s Maritime Law 
Enforcement (MLE) forces, including the China Coast Guard; and the 
Militia, which contains a growing proportion of sea-based units, the 
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each of China’s three 
sea forces is the world’s largest of its type.33 
Chinese maritime militias are internationally atypical, Vietnam being the only other 
country in the world to have them. The U.S. Navy War College’s China Maritime Institute 
describes China’s PAFMM as “an armed mass organization primarily comprising mariners 
working in the civilian economy who are trained and can be mobilized to defend and 
advance China’s maritime territorial claims, protect ‘maritime rights and interests,’ and 
support the PLA Navy (PLAN) in wartime.”34 China’s fishing fleet affords its leaders with 
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access to the most extensive collection of civilian fishermen and vessels in the world. 
According to an analyst reviewing 2016 Global Fishing Watch data: 
China has the world’s largest and farthest-ranging fishing operation, 
outstripping the next 10 biggest combined, according to what researchers 
say is the most comprehensive and data-intensive study on the subject. 
Ships from China amassed approximately 17 million hours of fishing in 
2016, mostly off the southern coast of their home country.35 
The massive fishing fleet serves as a first layer of defense, is a significant force 
multiplier in the near seas of China, and forms the foundation of the militia units. However, 
not all Chinese fishermen are members of a militia. The China Maritime Studies Institute 
report reinforces this idea. The authors contend that “China typically uses its capabilities 
in concert, with fishermen and maritime militia as the first line of defense, the China Coast 
Guard as the second, and the military as a force of last resort.”36 Of note, maritime militia 
units by overall percentage are considered a relatively small portion of the entire fishing 
fleet. Furthermore, militia units receive additional state-sponsored and -funded training and 
equipment, enabling coordination with PLAN and MLE units. China’s strategy and use of 
militias have inevitably led to an increased number of aggressive interactions with all states 
operating in the East and South China Seas. Michael Green concludes that “civilian fishing 
trawlers operating like a maritime militia were responsible for the more serious 
harassment.”37 
There is a relatively large body of scholarly work that agrees that the maritime 
militias are positioned to support Chinese strategic goals. This is echoed by Kennedy and 
Erickson, who argue that the maritime militia “contributes to China’s overall national 
defense mobilization work and … [are] a unique component of China’s armed forces armed 
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forces that are both separate from, and bound to, the PLA.”38 The relationship is endemic 
of the echelon defense strategy employed by Beijing’s military elites. 
This is a unique relationship that is reinforced by actions taken in 2016 when 
President Xi reorganized the PLA. Fanell and Gershaneck explain, “Xi announced that the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) would now be in charge of the ‘overall administration 
of the PLA, People’s Armed Police, militia, and reserves’ with new theater commands 
focusing on combat preparedness.”39 Centralization of authority under the CCP gives the 
leadership greater control of the escalatory process, limiting the potential for 
miscalculation. By bringing the militias under CCP authority, one can infer that future 
actions of the militias are sanctioned by senior CCP leadership. The militias are likely to 
continue to play an essential role, but not because of the reforms. Rather, because gray 
zone tactics are attractive to the PRC (not just the CCP or Xi Jinping) to further its national 
security interests in territorial aggrandizement without engaging in provocations that might 
escalate to war. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Chinese expansionism has taken advantage of a space in which China’s adversaries 
are unprepared to compete, leveraging ambiguity, incrementalism, and asymmetry. This is 
the foundation for the first hypothesis, which is that maritime militia utilization frustrates 
adversarial actions, in part due to the ambiguity and asymmetry afforded by their status as 
civilians. The frustration is the result of the civilian status of the maritime militias in 
disputes that are traditionally dominated by state components like the coast guard or navy. 
Typical state military and law enforcement organizations have rigorous standard operating 
procedures and legal limitations that guide responses and actions to civilian presence. 
China’s maritime militias take advantage of these institutional limitations as well as the 
ambiguity conferred by their status as civilian fishermen. Neither the U.S. nor its regional 
partners are equipped to contend with China in the gray zone. The Chinese have 
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maneuvered within a space that does not conform with current international norms or the 
rules-based order. 
In the 2018 report to Congress concerning China, U.S. DoD identified six primary 
Chinese strategic objectives: “the perpetuation of CCP rule, maintenance of domestic 
stability, economic growth and progress, defense of national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, status as a great power and return to regional preeminence, and safeguard China’s 
interests internationally.”40 For the Chinese to achieve these strategic objectives, they need 
to be in a continuous state of shaping operations within the regional environment. JP 3–0, 
Joint Operations, defines shaping operations as “activities [that] help set conditions for 
successful theater operations. They help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor 
and adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability.”41 Thus, continually 
maintaining shaping operations enables the Chinese to maintain activities that advance 
their strategic goals while limiting the potential for traditional conflict. The second 
hypothesis, then, is that maritime militia activities aim to prevent an escalation of regional 
conflict by maintaining continuous shaping operations that remain below adversary 
redlines, these methods of avoiding all-out war could either benefit or damage international 
relations. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The critical first step in this thesis is to provide a brief history regarding the strategic 
evolution of Chinese military and political strategy. The focus of this effort will be to 
address the following essential elements: China’s naval evolution from 1949 to present and 
China’s maritime perspective in regard to sovereignty, maritime rights, and the Three 
Warfares. Having established the strategic parameters, the thesis will proceed to an analysis 
of gray zone conflict and the advent of Chinese maritime militias. Finally, using a 
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qualitative case study methodology, the thesis concludes that maritime militia participation 
in gray zone conflict below the level of warfare effects international relations by violating 
norms associated with maritime law and the principle of distinction associated with civilian 
status in an armed conflict. 
In addition to the qualitative case study analysis, the thesis reviews a variety of 
primary sources concerning Chinese political and military strategy, gray zone conflict, and, 
more recently, the advent of maritime militias. In addition to scholarly information, the 
thesis draws upon a litany of government documents as well as secondary sources, 
including open-source information, which provides an additional perspective concerning 
the actions of international actors. 
F. OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II is strategically focused, examining China’s evolving maritime 
consciousness from 1949 to present. Additionally, it includes a discussion of the PRC’s 
most recently articulated military and political strategies and, broadly, how maritime 
militias are factored into each. Furthermore, the chapter will address China’s position in 
regard to territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. Chapter III will analyze the 
operationalization of the maritime militias within the gray zone. The chapter expands on 
the concept of gray zone conflict and examines the maritime militias specific to their 
application as a force multiplier, as China’s third sea force. Chapter IV transitions to 
tactical case studies: 2009 intimidation of the USNS Impeccable, 2014 Second Thomas 
Shoal Clash, and 2014 Vietnam oil rig dispute. These cases demonstrate Chinese strategies 
for employing maritime militias within the gray zone. Additionally, the case study analysis 
reveals how the maritime militias operate tactically in conjunction with other Chinese 
maritime platforms. Chapter V concludes the thesis by presenting the thesis findings and 
recommendations. Recommendations include how the United States can develop opposing 
strategies that counter gray zone competition, thus increasing maneuver space for U.S. 
forces.  
16 
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II. CHINA’S SEAPOWER EVOLVED: EXPANSION, 
MODERNIZATION, AND MOBILIZATION 
Understanding the PRC’s maritime motivations can expose the factors that have led 
to the expansion of naval operations, the modernization of China’s naval components, and 
the increase in mobilization efforts, specifically of the maritime militias. The chapter 
consists of three sections: PRC, CCP, and PLAN at Sea 1949–1989, 1990 to present 
(Informatization, Modernization, and Mobilization), and China’s Maritime Perspective. 
The chapter addresses the historical context and legacies that have resulted in the evolution 
of naval forces and strategies that support PRC expansionist political aims. Consequently, 
this chapter answers the first sub-question: What promotes China’s use of maritime militias 
in operations that support strategic objectives? 
A. INTRODUCTION: GRAND STRATEGY 
Chinese leaders and the Beijing elite, led by President Xi Jinping, have recently 
invoked the idea of the “Chinese Dream,” which is a framework for national renaissance. 
During a speech in 2012, Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a 
responsibility “in making continued efforts to achieve the great renewal of the Chinese 
nation, make the Chinese nation stand rock-firm in the family of nations, and make even 
greater contribution to mankind.”42 Although the Chinese Dream and Xi’s statement are 
not the affirmations of a codified grand strategy, they are in keeping with the broader 
agreement of the scholarly and national security communities as to what China’s grand 
strategy is. As Michael Swaine and Ashley Tellis explain, that grand strategy is “the 
preservation of domestic order and well-being in the face of different forms of social strife, 
… defense against persistent external threats to national sovereignty and territory, … [and 
the] attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence.”43 
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Swaine and Tellis’s characterization of PRC grand strategy carries within it the 
implicit task to defend China’s maritime territory and sovereignty. China’s most recent 
Defense White Paper (DWP) in 2015 affirms the significance of the maritime domain in 
China’s wider national security calculus and grand strategy, stating that “the traditional 
mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned and great importance has to be 
attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.”44 
Given the strategic shift and emphasis on the maritime domain by the Chinese in recent 
years, it is critical for policymakers and military leaders to understand how China’s 
maritime presence and, more specifically, how maritime militias can potentially undermine 
the status quo and subvert international norms. 
B. PRC, CCP, AND PLAN AT SEA 1949–1989: CONSTRAINED EARLY, 
DEVELOPING LATE 
From the beginning, Chinese naval strategy has been dominated by the concept of 
active defense in support of continental territory. Post-1949 PRC maritime strategy was an 
amalgamation of Soviet tactics and Mao’s people’s war theory. Huang contends that “the 
maritime military strategy of people’s war at sea was the foundation of Maoist China’s 
coastal defense. Namely, it was guerrilla warfare taken to the sea.”45 The maritime defense 
strategy of early years was predicated on both the threat of invading Kuomintang military 
forces from Taiwan, which routinely harassed and attacked PRC fisherman and coastal 
infrastructure in the 1950s, and defending against imperial threats from the sea. The first 
PLAN Commander, General Zhang Aiping, stated that the navy was required “to safeguard 
China’s independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty against imperialist aggression, 
… to destroy the blockade of liberated China, to support the land and air forces of the 
People’s Liberation Army in defense of Chinese soil and to wipe out all remnants of 
reactionary forces.”46 Aside from the coastal defense strategy and the defeat of the 
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nationalist, a key takeaway is the affirmation of the PLAN as guerrilla force. The PLAN’s 
use of asymmetric tactics can thus be traced back to its official inception in 1949 due to its 
inferior position compared to land-based forces. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the PLAN would be undermined in its efforts to 
modernize and expand naval operations. Huang contends that U.S. forces involved in the 
Korean Conflict made it “unrealistic, if not impossible, for Chinese defense policymakers 
to contemplate and execute naval development other than coastal defense.”47 Moreover, 
the Sino-Soviet divide further weakened naval modernization works. Hailong Ju asserts 
that due to the Sino-Soviet split, “China quickly shifted the focus of its national defense 
from the southeast coastal areas to the Sino-Soviet borders in the North … The navy was 
dropped from being the most important to the third.”48  Domestic and international factors 
during this period severely challenged PLAN growth, thus reinforcing the concept of a 
people’s war at sea given the PLAN’s material and personnel deficiencies. The relegation 
of the navy as a secondary fighting force would remain the perception until the mid-to-late 
1970s and the Paracels Battle at Sea. 
The Battle of the Paracels (Xisha) on January 19, 1974, would ultimately prove to 
be a watershed moment in the history of the PLAN and maritime militia employment. The 
engagement at sea pitted the qualitatively and quantitatively superior South Vietnamese 
navy against the far less capable Chinese South Sea Fleet. The battle at sea was the result 
of counter-claims over small islands in the South China Sea that are approximately 
equidistant from both nations. PLA naval units were directed from Hainan Island to 
respond to the South Vietnamese threat. Chinese fishing trawlers were already operating 
in vicinity of the Paracels, acting as forward observers. Toshi Yoshihara explains that 
at sea, trawlers Nos 402 and 407 acted as first responders. Months before 
the battle, the fishing boats maintained initial presence in the Paracels while 
asserting claims to the islands by planting flags on them. The trawlers then 
sent early warning to headquarters ashore when [South Vietnamese] 
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warships first arrived in the Paracels. The leaders on board also furnished 
tactical intelligence to the PLAN’s local commanders at sea.49 
By the mid-1970s, the PLAN had meaningfully increased its value by contributing 
to China’s broader strategy. Therefore, by the late 1970s, Beijing elites and intellectuals 
were increasingly supportive of manifesting a blue water capable force that was 
enigmatically connected to the status of being a great power. During a speech in 1979, 
Deng Xiaoping publicly called for China to “‘develop a powerful navy,’ and in 1985 he 
reiterated this point, calling for a navy with ‘real fighting capability.’”50 The mid-1980s 
marks the first major shift in Chinese maritime strategy since 1949. The strategy shifted 
from traditional coastal defense to “offshore defense,” demonstrating the PRC’s 
recognition of the importance of the blue water and expanding their maritime sphere of 
influence. The strategy is focused on increasing blue-water capabilities but does not 
preclude the employment of maritime militias; rather, it reinforces their importance in 
asserting China’s claims in the East and South China Seas.  
The transition to offshore defense marks a dramatic shift in China’s naval strategy. 
Bernard Cole asserts, “offshore defense is a maritime strategy with clear offensive 
implications: Beijing is moving its strategic line seaward from the coast demonstrating that 
the Navy has a key role in China’s twenty-first century.”51 The offshore defense transition 
ultimately serves China’s broader grand strategy, emphasizing territorial integrity and 
sovereignty as well as the defense of China’s economy, which requires unfettered access 
to global markets via sea lines of communication. Cole affirms this, explaining that an 
“offshore defense strategy includes missions to contain and resist foreign aggression from 
the seas, defend China’s territory and sovereignty, and safeguard the motherland’s 
unification and maritime rights.”52 The evolution and maturation of the PLAN after thirty 
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plus years of apathetic malaise has unequivocally transformed it into a capable blue water 
navy with immediate regional force protection capacities and global reach. However, the 
PRC continues to leverage its historical roots by employing maritime militias as a first line 
of defense in its near-seas commons. 
China’s maritime militias are uniquely representative of the bifurcation of the 
historical legacies imposed by a consistently redefined people’s war and the offensive 
realities of the modern international order. As the PLAN continues to expand global blue 
water operations with extensive international basing operations, China’s Maritime Law 
Enforcement (MLE) units and vast maritime militia will be increasingly called upon to 
defend the nation’s maritime claims. Huang asserts that “as long as the PLA Navy prepares 
itself for a defensive war at sea protecting Chinese claims of sovereignty, it will still be a 
people’s war at sea.”53 Given the historical legacies, PLAN advancements, and China’s 
incremental approach to the near maritime commons, maritime militias appear to be a 
distinctly Chinese approach to maritime conflict. 
C. 1990 TO PRESENT: INFORMATIZATION, MODERNIZATION, AND 
MOBILIZATION 
In the remaining years of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the PRC’s military 
strategy continued to shift as a result of China observing the evolution of modern warfare—
in particular, the 1991 Gulf War. The focus of the strategy was warfare under high-
technology conditions that would likely be limited in both geographic terms and duration. 
The strategy, which was termed “Winning Local Wars under High Technology 
Conditions,” has become the foundation to all subsequent modifications, including the 
most recent iteration, “Winning Informationalized Local Wars.” Regardless of the 
nomenclature adjustments that preceded the 1993 concept, the uncomplicated premise of 
the strategy is a combination of joint operations and modern military technology that allows 
a state to control or deny access to crucial terrain, while at the same time severely limiting 
the duration of the conflict. Former Vice Chairman of the CMC Liu Huaqing describes the 
strategy as a 
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shift from countering the invasion of one main enemy to countering multiple 
forms of conflicts from different adversaries, from defensive battles of long 
duration in the hinterland to short and decisive mobile operations in the 
coastal and border regions, from having plans for the battlefield and making 
long preparations for large-scale conflicts to making temporary 
arrangements and responding rapidly to limited conflicts, from ground 
warfare-based coordinated operations to joint operations of the three 
services with increased air and naval warfare.54 
Joint integrated forces that can rapidly acquire, disseminate, and act on information 
have a decisive advantage in modern warfare. The PLA strategy of “winning 
informationalized local wars,” is an affirmation of the evolution of modern military affairs 
and carries with it at least one particularly significant implication related to maritime 
development. First, while the focus is on joint integrated operations and the development 
of a cadre of highly technologically advanced conventional forces, the Chinese, perhaps 
for reasons of organizational culture and history or perhaps because of deliberate choice to 
facilitate gray zone tactics, have retained and enhanced their maritime militias. Therefore, 
modernization efforts have largely been directed at creating the necessary information 
infrastructure that enables joint integrated operations that include civilian components. 
PRC naval modernization in the last two decades is the result of unprecedented 
labor that crosses every line of effort that the maritime forces support. Ronald O’Rourke 
asserts that “China’s naval modernization effort is a broad-based effort … includ[ing] a 
wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs … maintenance and logistics, 
doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.”55 Additionally, a 
critical aspect of naval modernization is the integration of China’s other two sea forces—
MLE and maritime militias—with the PLAN. Sheng Bin, deputy of the National People’s 
Congress and Minister of National Defense Mobilization of the Central Military 
Commission, stresses that forces must “adapt to the requirements of informationized 
warfare … [and] promote the deep development of national defense mobilization of 
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military and civilian integration.”56  The employment of civilian maritime law enforcement 
and militias, in addition to the increasing civil-military integrations, has dramatically 
expanded China’s maritime instruments of power.  
Civil-military integration has become an increasingly significant element of the 
CCP’s strategy to preserve domestic order and defend territorial sovereignty. Andrew J. 
Nathan and Andrew Scobell assert that, after having been inactive for an extended period 
of time, some 8 million militia members resumed supporting the Chinese military in the 
early 2000s.57 Particular focus has been placed on the naval component of the militias. 
Andrew Erickson asserts that “maritime militias, meanwhile, are growing in proportion to 
their land-based counterparts as China prepares for ‘maritime military struggle.’”58 The 
maritime militias afford the CCP a massive force that, when positioned against regional or 
international naval forces, provides China with a numerically superior force and a vast 
network of forward observers. 
A direct chain of command exists to connect the CCP, PLA, MLE, and maritime 
militias. Furthermore, evidence also suggests that President Xi is increasingly involved in 
the direction of the militias and coordination with other defense forces. In 2015, the most 
substantial PLA reorganization in CCP history subordinated militia administrative control 
to the Central Military Commission (CMC), headed by President Xi.59 In addition, the 
Chinese Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group (LSG), which Xi leads as well, 
appears to be exercising increased command and control over a variety of maritime units 
and operations. Bonnie Glasser contends,  
Little is known about the work of the Maritime Rights Protection LSG. 
According to a few media reports, the LSG has been known to direct the 
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tactical movements of Chinese surveillance vessels and navy ships ‘over 
radio or television phone.’ Since the creation of the Maritime Rights 
Protection LSG, coordination has been notably enhanced among the navy, 
coast guard, SOA [State Oceanographic Administration], and maritime 
militia.60 
The revitalization of mobilization forces is in keeping with the 2015 Defense White 
Paper, which states “China aims to build a national defense mobilization system that can 
meet the requirements of winning informationized wars and responding to both 
emergencies and wars.”61 The Defense White Paper further serves to highlight the growing 
significance of China’s expanding maritime consciousness, stating that the “PLAN will 
gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of ‘offshore 
waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection.’ and build a combined, multifunctional and 
efficient marine combat force structure”62   
The PRC’s strategic focus on the maritime domain is a marked departure from the 
earliest years of the communist party and the People’s Liberation Army. Andrew Erickson 
stresses that 
whether viewed deductively from strategic intentions, or inductively from 
development, operational, and tactical actions, China’s increasingly-
modernized and -integrated maritime forces—centered on the PLAN—are 
pursuing a two-fold effort: intensive ‘near seas active defense’ of 
outstanding island and maritime claims on China’s maritime periphery, 
coupled with ‘far seas protection’ of more diffuse, diverse interests 
beyond.63 
China’s strategy in the maritime domain is a strategy of layered defense and 
integrated civil-military components, which significantly expands the PRC’s maritime 
domain awareness. The PLAN, MLE, and maritime militias are a critical element in the 
PRC’s broader strategy to exert pressure on both its regional neighbors and the 
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international community in an attempt to exercise control over vast swaths of the South 
and East China Seas. 
D. CHINA’S MARITIME PERSPECTIVE: SOVEREIGNTY, MARITIME 
RIGHTS, AND THREE WARFARES 
Territorial sovereignty has been a particularly sensitive issue for the Chinese, most 
notably due to the Century of Humiliation. As a result of this period of national dishonor, 
the CCP has always made the defense of territory and sovereignty against foreign threats a 
preeminent Chinese strategic objective. The evolution of territorial expansion to include 
the maritime domain marks a shift in the PRC’s recognition that safeguarding these critical 
elements not only facilitates the defense of the homeland but also, and more importantly, 
ensures the survival of the regime. Thus, China’s growing maritime consciousness is the 
result of both endogenous and exogenous motivations. Maritime expansion enables the 
CCP to actively engage the populace on issues of sovereignty and economic growth, which 
fundamentally reinforces the legitimacy of the party while at the same time expanding 
China’s powerful sphere of influence.   
China’s maritime disputes are centered on two primary issues: territorial and 
maritime rights. First are territorial disputes, which are present in both the South and East 
China Seas, where the PRC contests the authority of regional states to exercise sovereignty 
over various islands, islets, and features. The PRC’s Ministry of Foreign affairs (MFA) 
consistently affirms the CCP’s stalwart position in regard to maritime claims. Responding 
to the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s findings in the case of The Republic of the 
Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, the MFA stated, 
China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and their 
adjacent waters. And it is an indisputable fact that the Xisha Islands are an 
integral part of China’s territory. As early as 1948, the Chinese government 
published an official map which displayed “the dotted line” in the South 
China Sea. China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea and its claims to 
the relevant rights have been formed over a long course of history. They are 
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solidly grounded in international law and have been consistently upheld by 
successive Chinese governments.64 
China’s focus in the East China Sea is on eight islets that are administered by Japan 
but claimed by the PRC and Taiwan. The issue dates back to a fundamental disagreement 
over language in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, and, although the rocky outcroppings 
offer little in physical value other than fishing, their significance to national pride is 
incalculable. 
The second point of contention for the PRC is maritime rights. Ryan Martinson 
explains that maritime rights “refer to the rights of coastal states to use and administer areas 
of the ocean, as outlined in international law—above all, UNCLOS. These areas, or zones, 
include the territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and, in some cases, a continental shelf.”65  
The CCP’s interpretation and antagonistic stance regarding international laws and 
arbitration have, in effect, bred more significant conflict with regional neighbors as well as 
with the international community. Ian Bower affirms this, stating that “if a party chooses 
to ignore UNCLOS or parties have differing interpretations of its parameters and the 
obligations it imposes, the possibility for clashes is heightened since in contested areas at 
sea any exercise of administrative control is fluid and limited.”66  The PRC has consistently 
interpreted international law in favor of expanded maritime claims, while at the same time 
ignored the decision of international institutions that have ruled against Chinese interests. 
One can conclude that the PRC seeks only to apply those rules that support its position 
while employing tactics that undermine the broad consensus-based order. Territorial and 
maritime rights are, therefore, prime examples of the PRC strategy that seeks to 
operationalize the law in favor of Beijing’s maritime interests. China uses the law as a soft 
power weapon and, in recent years, has successfully connected it to its maritime force, 
which is increasingly integrated across naval, coast guard, and militia units. Commonly 
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referred to as lawfare, China’s legal arsenal is one the three central tenants of the Three 
Warfares doctrine. 
Introduced in 2003, the Three Warfares doctrine is the strategy to weaponize 
psychology, the media, and the law in an effort to mobilize all instruments of state power 
to compete in the international environment while attempting to remain below the level of 
war. Stefan Halper asserts that the Three Warfares doctrine “proceeds in a dimension 
separate both from the well-worn ‘hearts and minds’ paradigm and from the kinetic context 
in which power projection is normally gauged and measured ... [the Three Warfares] seek 
to alter the strategic environment in a way that renders kinetic engagement irrational.”67 
The use of Three Warfares factors prominently in the conflicts that originate in the South 
China and East China Seas. This is not to say that other claimants in the region are not 
using similar means, but it is of particular significance that the PRC has opted to codify 
this doctrine, which is essentially China’s gray zone warfare strategy. The U.S. Department 
of Defense defines the Three Warfares as the following: 
Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct 
combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and 
demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. 
Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public 
opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an 
adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests. 
Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high 
ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be employed to hamstring an 
adversary’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal 
warfare is also intended to build international support and manage possible 
political repercussions of China’s military actions. China has attempted to 
employ legal warfare in the maritime domain and in international airspace 
in pursuit of a security buffer zone.68 
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The Three Warfares doctrine is the PRC’s articulation to control the escalation of 
conflict. The Three Warfares factors prominently in maritime disputes where the PLAN 
and the integrated civil-military force—coast guard and militias—are the leading edge of 
China’s offshore defense strategy aimed at winning informationalized local wars. 
The militias are in a position to affect each of the Three Warfares. The PRC deploys 
the militias to subvert legal frameworks that inform how states’ militaries should respond 
to a civilian presence; by extension, this gains both a media and psychological advantage. 
From the perspective of the media, the CCP can drive a narrative that Chinese fishermen 
are victims of disproportionally aggressive regional neighbors, which, in effect, contributes 
to the psychological demoralization of those regional forces. The Battle of Paracels offers 
evidence of the maritime militia’s roles in subverting norms. Yoshihara stresses that 
in contrast to a naval presence that could have conveyed belligerence, the 
trawlers gave China a low-profile means to back up its territorial claims 
[Lawfare]. Even though the fishing boats engaged in provocative behavior, 
the ambiguities surrounding their identity and purpose furnished plausible 
deniability to Chinese leaders [Psychological]. The ostensibly civilian 
character of the trawlers added ammunition to Beijing’s diplomatic 
narrative that Saigon was the aggressor [Media].69 
Therefore, one can conclude that revitalization of maritime militias in the last ten 
years has enabled the PRC to control the escalation of conflict in the maritime domain 
while undermining regional states’ efforts to exert control over contested territory, echoing 
the effects of 1974 in the 21st century. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The PRC’s political and strategic calculations are endemic of a regime that is 
conditioned to see threats from all angles. Doug Livermore asserts that the “PRC, and 
particularly the CCP, sees itself today as beset on all sides (and internally) by potential 
threats, and it seeks to avoid open conflict whenever possible by employing minimally 
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offensive measures to pursue its objectives.”70 The PRC’s strategic threat calculus thus 
supports the development of strategies and units that are specifically designed to support a 
more assertive position in the maritime environment, but fundamentally frustrates 
adversaries’ traditional response mechanisms. What promotes China’s use of maritime 
militias is two-fold. First, it is an affirmation of historic precedent, vis-à-vis the Battle of 
the Paracels in 1974, the consequences of which continue to reverberate in the 21st century. 
The PRC’s deployment of maritime militias in support of the PLAN flotilla in many ways 
set the stage for maritime militia employment over 50 years later. One cannot deny the 
involvement of maritime militias in the conflict or the analogy for their use in the current 
security environment. 
Second, the PRC development of both political and military strategies encourages 
the use and integration of asymmetric forces. Militarily, this takes the form of winning 
informationalized local wars, includes an element of civilian integration and militia 
mobilization. Therefore, one of the strongest examples of this duality—mobilization and 
integration—is the use of maritime militias. Furthermore, the maritime militias can be a 
tool that crosses all three lines of effort articulated in the Three Warfares political doctrine, 
which can be aptly characterized as a political warfare. George F. Kennan explains that 
“Political Warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz doctrine in time of peace. In 
broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s 
command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.”71 Maritime militias are the 
physical manifestation of political warfare, becoming an integral part of the PRC’s 
maritime campaign. 
What the PRC is doing with the maritime militias is a microcosm of a much larger 
campaign to slowly reshape the status quo in an attempt to win without fighting. Patrick 
Cronin and Melodie Ha emphasize this point, stating that “China seeks to change the status 
quo through incremental actions, mobilizing both military and paramilitary forces, and 
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threats of coercion—but stopping short of steps that might trigger conflict.”72 As the PRC 
grows more assertive and coercive, the international community must develop antithetical 
hybrid warfare strategies that significantly constrain China’s ability to compete in the gray 
zone. 
The PRC’s effort to modernize the navy, reinvigorate mobilization—specifically 
maritime militias—and codify doctrine and strategy that is fundamentally an articulation 
of hybrid warfare indicates a conscious decision by the Chinese to keep conflict below the 
threshold of war. The Chinese are not unique in their efforts to control escalation and 
employ state tools that opt to subvert the international norms; however, the key in the case 
of the PRC is that there seems to be a concerted strategy from the highest levels of 
leadership to the lowest levels of citizen activism. The informatization, modernization, and 
mobilization efforts of China supports a conclusion that Beijing has a coherent multi-
faceted strategy to control escalation and constrain conflict below high-intensity conflict. 
This chapter has framed the evolution of China’s maritime strategy from 1949 to 
present and its continued use of maritime militias to show that Chinese strategy is, in part, 
designed to manage escalation and keep conflict below the threshold for war. The 
following chapter dives into the issue of gray zone conflict by examining why states pursue 
gray zone tactics and what tactics states use when competing in the gray zone. It critically 
examines China’s operationalization of the world’s largest fishing fleet into the world’s 
largest maritime militia, and how it has emerged as a gray zone force multiplier in the first 
two decades of the 21st century.   
                                                 
72 Patrick M. Cronin and Melodie Ha, “PacNet #42 - Toward a New Maritime Strategy in the South 
China Sea,” Pacific Forum, accessed June 26, 2018, https://www.pacforum.org/analysis/pacnet-42-toward-
new-maritime-strategy-south-china-sea. 
31 
III. THE GRAY ZONE – MARITIME MILITIAS 
OPERATIONALIZED 
This chapter is divided into two sections. First, it explores in greater detail the 
concept of gray zone conflict; next, it explores the operationalization of China’s fishing 
fleet as a maritime militia. The chapter provides the historical context concerning the gray 
zone as well as a brief examination of the stability-instability paradox. Furthermore, the 
gray zone section defines what the gray zone is, essential characteristics of it, and the tactics 
used to frustrate the adversary. The second section focuses on the development of Chinese 
maritime militias, including their structure, employment, and role in Chinese maritime 
strategy. Chapter 3 begins the process of answering the second sub-question: How does 
China use the maritime militias to prevent an escalation of regional conflict?  Defining 
gray zone key concepts and understanding maritime militia force structure is critical to the 
following case study chapter. 
A. THE GRAY ZONE 
In what is increasingly being referred to as an era of great power competition, the 
United States faces rising states that seek to advance their interests through alternative 
means that remain below the threshold of war. The U.S. National Security Strategy affirms 
the current era of competition, stressing that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an 
earlier century, great power competition [has] returned.”73 Therefore, given states’ 
increasing use of tactics that attempt to avoid war, the modern era of international 
competition can be progressively classified in terms of gray zone conflict. David Barno 
and Nora Bensahel assert that “gray zone conflicts are not formal wars, and little resemble 
traditional, ‘conventional’ conflicts between states.”74 The U.S. Department of State’s 
International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) contends that the gray zone represents the 
exploitation of “instruments beyond normal international interactions yet short of overt 
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military force.”75  What ultimately drives the gray zone strategy is the use of ambiguity 
and plausible deniability to avoid accountability. Historic examples of Chinese ambiguity 
and plausible deniability include China’s participation in the Korean War and Vietnam 
War, in which the PRC denied PLA involvement and, during the Korean War, went as far 
as issuing different insignia to the People’s Volunteer Army. Neither of these conflicts are 
considered to be state-on-state war with China but serve to highlight the ambiguity and 
plausible deniability intrinsic in gray zone conflict. The significance of China’s 
involvement was the capacity to achieve its aims at a cost far lower than war. The calculus 
to operate in the gray zone is critical in understanding the Chinese decision to 
operationalize civilian fishing fleets into a paramilitary maritime force. 
1. Why States Choose A Gray Zone Strategy 
Given the global asymmetry created by U.S. military power, the United States can 
exercise significant escalatory control within the international order. As a result of the 
United States’ conventional military supremacy, as well as its nuclear weapons deterrence, 
adversarial states increasingly pursue minor or indirect engagements as opposed to high-
intensity conflict. This occurrence is related to the international relations concept of the 
stability-instability paradox, which offers a useful explanation of why states would pursue 
a gray zone strategy. Robert Jervis defines the stability-instability paradox in the following 
terms: “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, 
it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”76 The paradox is more than a 
qualitative assessment of the stability induced by nuclear weapons in the international 
domain. When comparing two nuclear-equipped states, the paradox offers further insight 
into a state’s policy decision that exploits the gray zone. Robert Rauchhaus finds that 
“when there is symmetry, and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war 
precipitously drop… [and] simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity 
disputes.”77  However, it should be noted that this is not the case for all states that possess 
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nuclear weapons. The Kargil War is one example, in which India and Pakistan fought a 
limited state-on-state war shortly following nuclear testing in 1998. However, given the 
escalation dominance imposed by the United States and the empirical findings of 
Rauchhaus, one can conclude that dissatisfied states would naturally pursue strategies that 
avoid the strengths of the status quo power but still advance interests elsewhere. 
2. Historical Perspective 
Arguably the two greatest military strategists and philosophers, Sun Tzu and Carl 
von Clausewitz recognized the significance of the gray zone competition without ever 
having called it that. They profoundly understood the significance of political outcomes 
and that war should indeed be an option of last resort.   
Approximately 2,300 years before Clausewitz, Sun Tzu unknowingly described 
two of the critical characteristics of gray zone conflict: ambiguity and asymmetry. Writing 
that “tactics are like water. For water, in its natural course, runs away from high places and 
hastens downwards. So, in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and strike at what is 
weak. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare, there are no constant 
conditions.”78  The employment of ambiguous and asymmetric tactics by states is not new, 
regardless of the relatively recent revival within the national security, political, and military 
spheres. Regardless of the age of the concept or its employment by states, it is critical that 
activities in the gray zone be rapidly identified, understood, and countered. In an era of 
great power competition, revisionist states are increasingly leveraging gray zone strategies 
in an attempt to avoid war while still shifting the international order in their favor. 
Therefore, it can be argued that high-end conventional war can be a stand-in for nuclear 
war in the modern era, leading to similar effects as described by the stability-instability 
paradox. High-end conventional war represents an incredibly destructive force that is 
arguably far more likely to occur than nuclear war and, given the destructive capacitates of 
modern militaries, states are inclined to seek alternative strategies in pursuit of national 
interests that avoid breaching the threshold for high-intensity conflict.  
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Political objectives are what Clausewitz considered “the original motive for the 
war.”79 From that, Clausewitz postulates that “if [political aim] is all a calculation of 
probabilities based on individuals and conditions, the political object…must become an 
essential factor in the equation. The smaller the penalty you demand from your opponent, 
the less you can expect him to try and deny it to you; the smaller the effort he makes, the 
less you need make yourself.”80 Clausewitz is speaking directly to the third characteristic 
of gray zone conflict—incrementalism—or what is commonly referred to as the Chinese 
strategy of salami slicing.81  As Robert Haddick expresses, “If sliced thinly enough, no one 
action will be dramatic enough to justify starting a war.”82 The implications for state 
actions within the gray zone become clearer when understanding that competition does not 
have to conform to a particular set of conditions and that the political outcome is the 
preeminent goal. 
3. Defining the Gray Zone 
The gray zone is, at its essence, a space where states conduct operations between 
peace and war, employing strategies that attempt to lessen the likelihood that an adversary 
will pursue war. Gray zone strategies may challenge the international rules-based order, 
while others are simply orthogonally connected. Regardless, the principle aim of gray zone 
strategies is the incremental modification of the status quo in favor of one state’s interests. 
Activities within the gray zone often employ unconventional tools, techniques, and 
procedures that undermine an adversary’s position while remaining below the threshold 
for war. Irrespective of the activities, the only universal principle of gray zone conflict is 
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remaining below the inception point of war. As defined by Philip Kapusta, the gray zone 
is the “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall 
between the traditional war and peace duality.”83 Gray zone strategies ultimately serve to 
undermine the adversary’s capacity and ability to respond, while attempting to evade a 
kinetic retaliatory reaction. However, it does not mean that a relatively limited armed 
conflict may not be a potential outcome of gray zone conflict.  
Competitors within the gray zone space seek to employ a spectrum of capabilities 
in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. John Schaus contends that “the main tools employed 
by malign actors operating in the gray zone include: Military, paramilitary, or other-state 
controlled forces, proxy forces, information warfare, corruption of politicians, economic 
tools and shaping civil society.”84 China is undoubtedly employing many of these tools in 
various capacities; however, most notable to this research is the use of paramilitary-like 
forces within the maritime domain. Katherine Morton notes that “China is now undergoing 
a maritime renaissance to secure its destiny as a great maritime nation, raising unsettling 
questions about the epicenter of geopolitical power in the contemporary era.”85 The use of 
proxy forces combined with China’s resurgence in the maritime domain presents issues 
that policymakers, political leaders, and military commanders must confront in the 
competitive gray zone space. 
4. Gray Zone Characteristics 
The gray zone definition by Philip Kapusta adopted in this research provides the 
broad context for what gray zone conflict is. This section examines the three primary 
characteristics of gray zone conflict: ambiguity, the exploitation of asymmetries, and 
gradualism. States leverage ambiguity, asymmetric advantages, and a gradualist approach 
to increase their influence while limiting kinetic retaliatory action. These characteristics 
are critical conceptual terms in understanding how and why states use various diplomatic, 
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informational, military, and economic modalities to limit the escalation of competition 
above the threshold for war. 
Arguably the preeminent characteristic of gray zone conflict is ambiguity. David 
Barno and Nora Bensahel assert that for gray zone conflicts “their defining characteristic 
is ambiguity—about the ultimate objectives, the participants, whether international treaties 
and norms have been violated, and the role that military forces should play in response.”86  
When nations employ forces that are ambiguous in purpose and intent, they are able to 
disguise their intentions while attempting to avoid attribution. This hinders an adversary’s 
ability to determine the exact nature of the threat and how to counter it.   
Furthermore, the international system is not designed to counter ambiguity. When 
acts are ambiguous, state and multinational strategies are often unable to contend with them 
effectively. Fundamentally, ambiguity allows revisionist and status quo states the ability to 
conceal their intentions and actions by exploiting asymmetries that are inherent in the 
international order. As Heidi Reisinger and Alexander Golts explain, “ambiguity, make[s] 
an adequate reaction extremely difficult, especially for multinational organizations that 
operate on the principle of consensus.”87 Thus, the consensus rules-based order contributes 
to increased transparency in the international environment, thereby reducing strategic 
ambiguity. These agreed upon rules have subsequently disincentivized a state’s use of 
traditional outright violence with which to advance their interests. Instead, states are 
compelled to use gray zone tactics that attempt to adjust the status quo gradually, accepting 
limited gains relative to their material power. 
Historically, asymmetry has been primarily been used to compare one state’s 
relative military power to that of another. However, Frank Hoffman asserts that 
“asymmetry has been sought in operational terms within traditional military dimensions.”88  
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Therefore, in an era of increasing gray zone conflict, analysis and judgement of asymmetry 
requires a more expansive understanding. Michael Green argues that asymmetry is 
determined by a state’s “calculations of cost and benefit derive[d] largely from a state’s 
assessment of its interests and capabilities and those of its adversary and any third 
parties.”89  Green’s assessment of state calculation infers that there are two broad categories 
of asymmetry—interest and capabilities. 
Interest asymmetries are nominal value incongruities. This means that states 
fundamentally have different values that drive their interests within the international order. 
Capability asymmetries, on the other hand, fall in the more traditional analysis of hard 
power capabilities but can expand across the spectrum of soft power to include 
psychological, legal, and media. Therefore, asymmetry calculations are about identifying 
areas of the adversary that are vulnerable to exploitation, which, when exploited, do not 
cross any red lines and incur only insignificant costs but that fundamentally frustrate the 
adversary’s ability to employ its strengths. 
The last characteristic of the gray zone is the idea of gradualism or incrementalism. 
Thomas Schelling refers to this idea as “salami tactics,” which are “low-level incident[s] 
or probe[s] and tactics of erosion. One tests the seriousness of a commitment by probing 
in a noncommittal way … both to forestall the reaction and to avoid backing down.”90  
Incrementalism is akin to the analogy of slowly boiling a frog so that it does not perceive 
the immediate risk to its safety and jump out of the pot. In very much the same way, states 
take gradual steps that do not overwhelmingly upset the status quo, thus decreasing the 
chance of unnecessarily provoking the dominant power’s will. Michael Mazarr argues that 
“the goal is often not just to achieve a narrow objective, but rather to use an avalanche of 
incremental steps as the catalysts of an entirely new strategic reality. Gradualist approaches 
are especially appealing to measured revisionists.”91 Gradualism is thus understood as a 
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state’s attempt to limit the inertia of competition from escalating to a conflict that would 
inevitably result in achieving a terminal velocity leading to war. 
5. Gray Zone Tactics: Coercion and/or Fait Accompli 
Coercion is an important aspect to consider when examining international relations; 
however, the focus on anticipated violence may not make it the most advantageous metric 
to analyze gray zone conflict. That is because, as Mazarr explains, “Gray zone strategies 
pursue political objectives through calculated and integrated campaigns to achieve specific 
and often quite ambitious goals … [and] employ mostly non-military or non-kinetic 
tools.”92 As Mazaar points out, gray zone conflicts are primarily competitive interactions 
using tactics that are, for the most part, limited in regard to kinetic actions. This point 
proves particularly important when one considers how Thomas Schelling describes 
coercion. Schelling asserts that for states’ actions “to be coercive, violence has to be 
anticipated. The power to hurt is bargaining power.”93 Therefore, the threat of violence is 
the means to achieve political ends. However, in the gray zone, where the threat of violence 
is often restrained, the focus is employing tactics that attempt to deter the adversary from 
employing more fully all instruments of national power, specifically military forces.   
The broad scholarly consensus is that coercion can be understood through either 
the lens of deterrence or compellence. As Green explains, “attempts to coerce include both 
efforts to compel a state to take a desired action and efforts to deter a state from taking 
unwanted action.”94 Given Schelling’s conclusion that coercion is connected with the 
threat of violence, it would appear that coercion when defined in these terms would run 
counter to the prevailing goal of gray zone conflict, which is the inducement of change 
while attempting to remain below the threshold of war. Therefore, in territorial disputes, 
coercion may be a less active element of gray zone competition.   
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Fait accompli, on the other hand, which is traditionally relegated as a subset of 
coercion, is uniquely fitted to explain aspects of gray zone conflict, particularly those 
involving territorial disputes and the use of China’s maritime militias. Dan Altman asserts 
that a “fait accompli imposes a limited unilateral gain at an adversary’s expense in an 
attempt to get away with that gain when the adversary chooses to relent rather than escalate 
in retaliation.”95 A fait accompli strategy attempts to shift the status quo faster than the 
adversary can respond, as opposed to coercion, where the aggressor seeks consent via 
threat. The point of a fait accompli is to place the adversary in a position where they must 
compel the aggressor state into reversing its actions.   
A fait accompli favors the aggressor because the adversary state must employ a 
significantly higher magnitude of force to compel the aggressor state to abandon pursuing 
the gain or change in status quo. As Van Jackson contends, faits accomplis “stack the deck 
of strategic interaction in favor of the aggressor at the expense of the defender’s preferences 
by encouraging restraint in the latter.”96 Ultimately, a fait accompli seeks to avoid conflict 
or cross red lines that would elicit any response; it is, at its essence, an incremental strategy 
and, thus, a vital component of any successful gray zone strategy. 
In summary, the modern gray zone is fundamentally an environment born of the 
stability imposed by nuclear weapons and high intensity conflict that irrevocably alter the 
global social and security environment. Fearing such permanent and irreversible 
consequences, states pursue methods of change and destabilization well below the 
threshold of war. Therefore, the stability-instability paradox has resulted in modifications 
of state instruments of power that can alter the status quo while at the same time managing 
escalation. The primary escalatory control mechanism through which states seek to achieve 
change in the gray zone is incrementalism or ‘salami slicing.’ 
Incrementalism, one of three primary characteristics of gray zone activities, enables 
a state to achieve territorial concessions by fait accompli. The PRC maritime militias are a 
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physical force that can gradually encroach on contested territorial claims and maintain a 
presence in those areas that carries with it the inherent application of Chinese sovereignty, 
supporting a fait accompli. Maritime militias are uniquely positioned to accomplish this 
task as they work in non-traditional security roles that are not overtly coercive, but rather 
are exploiting the ambiguity conferred by their status as civilians. Empirically, faits 
accomplis have proven to be far more effective than coercion for attaining territory. Altman 
finds that “land grabs attempting to take smaller territories without provoking war as part 
of a fait accompli strategy are now the predominant form of territorial conquest. Conquest 
has not gone away, but rather has become smaller, more targeted, and less violent.”97  In 
the PRC’s attempt to extend maritime control and not provoke conflict, maritime militias 
fill a critical role in maintaining the requisite presence to assert sovereignty. 
B. PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES MARITIME MILITIAS – A FORCE 
MULTIPLIER 
Chinese leaders and Beijing elites view the maritime commons of the South (SCS) 
and East China Seas (ECS) as extensions of China’s national territory. Ryan Martinson 
asserts, “Chinese leaders believe that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) entitles them to jurisdictional rights over three million square kilometers of 
maritime space.”98 In order to exercise dominion over this incredibly broad swath of the 
maritime commons, China has dramatically expanded naval operations, leveraging the 
world’s largest fishing fleet as a force multiplier in coordination with the PLA Navy 
(PLAN) and China’s Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) forces, including the Chinese 
Coast Guard (CCG). Abhijit Singh contends that “by acting assertively and 
unprofessionally in the vicinity of other states, China’s Coast Guard boats and fishing 
vessels seek to assert dominance in areas surrounding disputed features. Their activities are 
consciously kept below the threshold of conflict, yet demonstrate China’s resolve to 
establish control over disputed features.”99 China’s maritime militias are one element of its 
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maritime forces being used to exercise control over what China perceives as its entitlement. 
The following section defines exactly what the maritime militias are, how they are 
controlled, and, lastly, which units are setting the standard for the maturation of maritime 
militias throughout coastal China. 
1. Defining China’s Maritime Militias: Tactical Force, Strategic Effect 
The maritime militias have been incorporated in various international disputes, 
including the 1974 Battle of the Paracels. They have supported island reclamation and 
militarization efforts during the 1990s and, more recently, played a pivotal role in the 2012 
Scarborough Shoal seizure. The leading experts, credited with coining the term “People’s 
Armed Forces Maritime Militia” (PAFMM), Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy define 
militias as “local forces levied by provincial governments to support national defense 
efforts.”100 This seemingly simple definition highlights two key features: first, the militias 
are grassroots, locally sustained elements and, second, there exists an interconnected 
structure between the militias, the PLA, and the CCP concerning command and control. In 
an annual report to Congress, the Department of Defense described the maritime militias 
as a 
subset of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians 
available for mobilization. The PAFMM is the only government-sanctioned 
maritime militia in the world. Militia units organize around towns, villages, 
urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and 
mission. In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a significant role in 
coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part 
of broader PRC military doctrine stating confrontational operations short of 
war can be an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.101 
The enormity of China’s fishing fleet, which is the source of the maritime militias, 
cannot be overstated. Greenpeace reports that as of 2014, the total PRC fishing fleet 
numbered more than 2,400 vessels, which is approximately 10 times larger than the U.S. 
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fleet.102 It should be noted that not all vessels are included in the maritime militia category; 
however, access to a fleet of this size affords the PRC with significant mobilization 
capacities. A February 2018 study from the Global Fishing Watch found that “When China 
and Taiwan are analyzed together, they account for approximately 52% of the industrial 
fishing effort … detected on the high seas, which, by reference, is an amount approximately 
12 and 27 times greater than the high seas fishing effort detected for the United States and 
Russia, respectively.”103 According to automatic identification system (AIS) data recorded 
and reported by Global Fishing Watch in 2016, PRC fishing fleet spent approximately 1.7 
million hours fishing on the high seas, or 110,300 days, accounting for nearly 30% of 
global fishing efforts.104 China’s industrial fishing fleet has no equal and provides the PRC 
with a global presence. 
As a unique element of China’s armed forces, the maritime militias are distinctively 
positioned to execute gray zone operations that seek to expand and enforce Chinese claims 
in the SCS and ECS. The maritime militias are a part of a comprehensive, incremental 
approach by the Chinese, which seeks to employ non-military forces against regional states 
and powers. The maritime militias are representative of the idea that a tactical force can 
have a significant strategic effect, or as Erickson and Kennedy assert, the maritime militias 
“are as political as they are operational.”105 
The maritime militias’ primary role in supporting Chinese national defense strategy 
has been one of territorial defense. As Singh asserts, “the idea behind Chinese militia 
operations is to exert authority over a maritime space using civilian craft and personnel, 
but doing it in a way that precludes open military confrontation.”106 However, Military 
District Commander Major General Zhang Jian suggests that there are three roles for 
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maritime militias in support of Chinese interests that are broader than territorial defense. 
Zhang writes that these three roles include using “civilians against civilians for regular 
demonstration of rights,” “special cases of rights protection by using civilians in 
cooperation with law enforcement,” and “participation in combat and support-the-front by 
using civilians to support the military.”107 Each of these roles fundamentally exploits the 
use of civilians as a paramilitary force to execute operations that, when conducted by 
traditional military forces, would likely increase the risk of war. Thus, intrinsically the 
employment of maritime militias represents a concerted effort to control the escalation of 
force by undermining regional military actors’ ability to oppose Chinese civilians without 
using a seemingly disproportionate use of force. Arguably, this strategy is preferred to an 
alternative in which traditional military forces engaged in open hostilities, which would 
more overtly destabilize the region. 
2. Dual-Track Command and Control 
The force generation and regulation of militias rely heavily on the strength of civil-
military relations. In most socialist states, civil-military relations can be more aptly 
characterized as “party-army relations.” Party-army relations is a particularly salient 
element given that the PLA can be considered the action element of the CCP. The 
relationship between socialist states and civil-military relations explains the dual-track 
leadership that it is characteristic of the PAFMM from the highest levels of government to 
the lowest provincial levels. Shinji Yamaguchi explains this relationship, stating that “at 
the levels of provincial military districts and sub-districts, militia are organized and trained 
under the People’s Armed Forces Departments of local governments. The National 
Defense Mobilization Committee coordinates local governments and the military.”108 
While overlap exists concerning administrative control, the National Defense Mobilization 
Committee and the People’s Armed Forces Departments are responsible for different 
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aspects of operational and tactical employment. The following examines the differences in 
administrative and tactical control of the maritime militias from both the national and 
provincial level. 
a. National Control 
As of 2016 reforms, the National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD) is 
now one of seven functional departments directly subordinated to the Central Military 
Commission (CMC), headed by President Xi Jinping. Erickson and Kennedy explain that 
NDMD is a “consulting and coordinating body in ‘charge of organizing, directing and 
coordinating nationwide national defense mobilization.’ The committee plays a major role 
in ensuring that national resources can swiftly be transferred towards war or national 
emergency efforts.”109 In 2016, Sheng Bin, Minister of National Defense Mobilization of 
the Central Military Commission, discussed how the NDMD would pursue expanded 
mobilization for national defense, explicitly addressing maritime militias. Sheng asserted 
that China must “vigorously strengthen the building of national defense mobilization 
forces. Adjust and optimize the size, structure and layout of the militia and reserve forces, 
highlight the construction of maritime militia … [and] promote the construction of national 
defense mobilization to the ocean.”110 The primary purpose of the NDMD is to establish 
unity of effort and leadership for continued national defense mobilization. Erickson asserts 
that “overall militia policy is first set in Beijing.”111 Therefore, NDMD leadership is crucial 
in translating the national agenda, guiding the development of maritime militias, and 
regulating tactics, training, and procedures. 
b. Provincial Command 
Below the NDMD level of control is the command of Provincial Military Districts 
(MD). The MD are the direct link between PLA leadership and the subordinate People’s 
Armed Forces Detachments (PAFD) under which the PAFMM are further subordinated. 
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Erickson and Kennedy clarify this division: “The local PLA commands… then organize, 
train, and command the militia units.”112 Below the provincial level are the PAFDs, which 
are separated into county-level and grassroots-level. Erickson and Kennedy explain: 
The county-level PAFDs, through which PAFMM communications and 
directives—such as mobilization and mission orders—must typically pass, 
are manned by active duty PLA personnel. Below them, the grassroots 
PAFDs are manned by civilian cadres whose salaries are paid by local 
governments and sometimes work on a part-time basis. These grassroots 
PAFDs are the closest interface through which militia interact with the PLA 
command on a regular basis, as their direct managers for recruitment, 
planning, organization, training, and policy execution.113 
Arguably, the most significant aspect of this relationship is the direct role that active 
duty PLA personnel play in the employment of the maritime militias. This point harkens 
back to the idea of party-army relations and the significance of civil-military relations 
regarding militia mobilization. Thus, from a security policy perspective, this confirms that 
the maritime militias are a conduit for CCP strategic objectives regarding territorial 
disputes in the SCS and ECS. 
3. Leading the Way: Hainan Island Militias 
Chinese open sources are replete with discussions of the expansion of militias. A 
recent article in 2016 titled, “Accelerate the Reserve Force, Build Transformation and 
Development,” calls for the expansion of maritime militias along China’s more than 9,000 
miles of coastline.114 Arguably, the preeminent organization for which all subsequent 
militias will be modeled are the militias of Hainan Island, which Eric Martinson attests is 
“the province that nominally exercises jurisdiction over all two million square kilometers 
of Chinese-claimed waters in the South China Sea.”115 Hainan Island’s strategic position 
has given rise to four significant maritime militias—Tanmen, Sanya, Danzhou, and 
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Sanya—which have established a reputation among the Chinese for their courage, but 
among regional actors as antagonists threatening established international norms. Erickson 
and Kennedy echo this point, contending that Hainan Island represents a “standing, front-
line force whose leading units are lauded as models for other localities to emulate.”116 
These four militias have been the primary actors in numerous maritime disputes within the 
SCS and are unquestionably the leading edge of China’s maritime gray zone strategy. 
Hainan provincial leadership has essentially written the book on building maritime 
militias. In 2015, Political Commissar of Hainan Island Liu Xin published an article in 
China’s National Defense Journal, stating “China’s coastal defense security situation is 
complex and full of variables. We must conscientiously study and implement the important 
instructions of President Xi on strengthening the construction of maritime militias and 
safeguarding the national maritime rights and interests.”117 Commissar Liu subsequently 
expanded on this and, in 2016, authored the “The 13th Five-Year Plan for the Construction 
of Maritime Militia in Hainan Province.” The 13th Five-Year plan stipulates a systematic 
approach to the tasking and employment of the militias, force generation, institutional 
dogma, and separation of responsibilities. The Hainan model of maritime militia generation 
is increasingly significant as China continues to exploit the maritime commons via 
aggressive gray zone tactics. If China remains mostly undeterred in its activities in the SCS, 
the region will see these militias spread, further disrupting the regional balance with 
potential implications well beyond the first island chain. 
C. CONCLUSION: CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIAS A GRAY ZONE 
FORCE 
Using the three characteristics of the gray zone, ambiguity, asymmetry, and 
incrementalism, a strong case can be made that China’s maritime militias are a gray zone 
force that operates below the threshold of war. Maritime Militia activities thrive on 
ambiguity and, as a result, are an asymmetric force multiplier given the sheer volume of 
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vessels that can be impressed into service. The ambiguous nature of the militias affords the 
PRC with plausible deniability due to their lack of international recognition as threats in 
the maritime domain. Therefore, Beijing can ostensibly maintain a narrative that actions of 
maritime militias are the consequence of independent nationalist actors and not sanctioned 
by the government. However, as previously discussed, substantial information exists that 
connects the highest levels of CCP leadership with maritime militia activities. Additionally, 
the size of the fishing fleet further contributes to the issue of ambiguity because states are 
limited in their ability to differentiate maritime militias from traditional fishing activities. 
Ultimately, these dynamisms cause regional and international actors to assume that 
all Chinese flagged fishing vessels are potential militia elements and, thus, extensions of 
Beijing’s maritime strategy. Having to contend with a maritime militia force of the 
magnitude of China’s consequently stresses regional and international states who cannot 
effectively restrain Beijing’s third sea force. Valery Gerasimov echoes this point, stating 
that “the very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving 
political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power 
of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”118 Revisionist states, like China, have 
effectively employed forces that capitalize on ambiguity, severely frustrating adversaries’ 
decision-making. Doug Livermore stresses that China “deploys maritime militias 
throughout the region to reinforce its claim[s], sowing confusion as the opposing naval 
forces are uncertain of how exactly to respond.”119 Beijing’s decision to use ambiguous 
non-conventional forces to control escalation is a means to achieve victory short of war, to 
“win without fighting.” 
The maritime militias are a critical aspect of China’s incremental approach to 
territorial disputes via fait accompli strategy in the maritime domain. Mazaar asserts that 
revisionist “states want to overturn elements of the system without causing general 
instability. They tend to be patient enough to take a piecemeal approach if it will help 
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balance their mixed goals of transformation and stability.”120  The maritime militias afford 
China presence without threat and are for that reason far less likely to destabilize the region. 
China can therefore maintain a fast network of forward maritime observers that are in the 
first line of off-shore defense. 
The vastness of the fishing fleet affords the Chinese with a force that can maintain 
a persistent presence near contested islands and features, allowing for the gradual 
acceptance by the international community of Chinese sovereignty. Like ambiguity, 
incremental approaches make it exceedingly complicated for states to determine if any 
singular action breaches the threshold that would prompt a counter-action. China’s gray 
zone operations and use of maritime militias ought to be signal to the international 
community that China is serious about imposing its claims. Maritime militia presence can 
be compared to what Martinson refers to as the “act of dropping sovereignty markers.”121 
This, according to one Chinese source quoted by Martinson, “allows China to ‘quietly 
express its strong will’ to defend its sovereignty … In this respect, then, Chinese ships 
serve to perpetuate a national myth.”122 Beijing’s maritime militia use is strong evidence 
of China’s gray zone strategy, which seeks to incrementally shift the status quo in favor of 
the PRC’s territorial maritime claims. 
The subsequent chapter will explore in greater detail People’s Armed Forces 
Maritime Militia’s role in China’s gray zone strategy. Analysis will focus on three cases in 
which the participation and presence of the maritime militias constrained incidents at sea 
that might have otherwise resulted in conflict if traditional military forces were the 
spearhead of the action. In keeping with the characteristics of gray zone conflict, the case 
studies reflect the ambiguity of territorial disputes, the asymmetry of a civilian fishing fleet 
versus regional military actors, and China’s incremental fait accompli strategy in its near 
maritime commons. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES – THE GRAY ZONE AT SEA 
This chapter examines three incidences at sea in which China’s maritime militias 
have played a prominent role. It should be noted, however, that, with regard to Chinese 
coercion and gray zone activities, there exists a litany of incidences beyond those including 
maritime militias. These three incidents were chosen for the following analytical reasons. 
First, the cases are sourced from the broader well-defined research regarding Chinese 
maritime coercion. Second, these three particular cases of maritime coercion are 
demonstrative of maritime militia participation as a critical element of each dispute. Third, 
the three cases indicate a trend line from 2009–2014 that suggests the maritime militia 
forces are expanding in both size and capability. Additional incidences of Chinese coercion 
span the breadth of the national instruments of power.123 Actions of this nature, regardless 
of the provocateur, can be considered detrimental to the international order. To best address 
the thesis’ primary research question—how do China’s maritime militias participating in 
gray zone conflict impact international relations—this chapter considers the 2009 
intimidation of the USNS Impeccable, 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff, and 2014 
Vietnam oil rig dispute. 
A. CASE 1: INTIMIDATION OF THE USNS IMPECCABLE – 2009 
1. Overview 
In March 2009, the USNS Impeccable was conducting routine ocean surveillance 
operations approximately 75 nautical miles south of Hainan Island, when it was challenged 
by Chinese forces that included naval surface vessels, maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 
and civilian fishing trawlers. The Chinese forces employed various tactics and procedures 
in an attempt to intimidate the USNS Impeccable, resulting in the ship’s eventual departure 
from the area. Chinese fishing trawlers, acting as militia units, dumped debris in front of 
the Impeccable and attempted to sever its towed array SONAR, forcing the Impeccable to 
alter course. Chinese naval vessels and fishing trawlers maneuvered in both an 
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unprofessional and unsafe manner. As with prior instances of Chinese objection regarding 
U.S. operations in the South China Sea, diplomatic exchanges between the United States 
and the PRC restored the status quo. However, the exchanges failed to produce any lasting 
resolution. Later in March, the USNS Impeccable was escorted back to the surveillance 
area under the guard of the USS Chung-Hoon, DDG-93; In this case, China did not respond. 
Nevertheless, routine harassment of U.S. forces continued throughout 2009.   
2. Contextual Analysis: Freedom of the Oceans – Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) Rights 
Central to the 2009 incident is the competing narrative between Washington and 
Beijing concerning the freedom of the seas and jurisdictional rights in a nation’s exclusive 
economic zones. The crux of the legal conflict rests on each nation’s interpretation of a 
coastal state’s sovereign right to administer and regulate its EEZ, defined in the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). More narrowly defined, it is the issue of 
whether the coastal states are permitted to police military activities beyond territorial 
waters. Beijing supports a coastal state’s right to police and regulate military activities 
beyond territorial waters extending out the 200 nautical miles (nm) afforded by the EEZ.124 
However, Washington vehemently opposes China’s interpretation, asserting that the 
coastal states are not allowed to exercise jurisdiction beyond territorial waters over flagged 
state vessels if they are engaged in permissible, peaceful activities. 
The 1982 UNCLOS establishes that coastal states have certain economic and 
scientific sovereign rights extending 200 nm from their territorial baselines. UNCLOS 
Article 56 declares that within the EEZ: 
The coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living 
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and 
its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation 
and exploration of the zone … [and] establishment and use of artificial 
                                                 
124 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving 
China: Issues for Congress, CRS Report No. R42784 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
April 26, 2018), 5. 
51 
islands, installations, and structures; marine scientific research; the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.125 
China has used language in Article 56, as well as Article 246, which allows coastal 
states to regulate marine scientific research in the EEZ, to justify restricting and interfering 
with a state’s attempt to conduct intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance activities 
within China’s EEZ.126 Regardless of Chinese assertions, the United States consistently 
extolls the rights of all states to have access to the maritime commons, citing Article 87 of 
UNCLOS, which states that: 
These freedoms shall be exercised by all States … freedom of navigation; 
freedom of overflight; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted 
under international law; freedom of fishing; freedom of scientific 
research.127 
Further contributing to the fractious debate concerning EEZ rights has been 
Beijing’s use of domestic law to reinforce its claims. To reinforce its expansive EEZ 
claims, China’s domestic laws have been written to explicitly prohibit foreign military 
operations, which include intelligence collections. As China seeks to impose unilateral 
domestic legislation that conflicts with UNCLOS, it has simultaneously sent PLAN units 
into other nation’s EEZ and territorial waters. DoD remarked in its 2018 annual report to 
Congress that “This contradiction highlights China’s continued lack of commitment to the 
rules of customary international law.”128 Understanding the EEZ debate is critical to 
understanding the broader implications arising from the harassment of the USNS 
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Impeccable. Of note, China’s interpretation of UNCLOS and the adoption of domestic 
legislation are issues that are inherent to all three case studies. 
Nearly all nations agree with the U.S. interpretation; however, 27 countries agree 
with China’s interpretation of EEZ rights regarding the regulation of foreign military 
operations. The U.S. Navy identifies the following nations in the minority interpretation: 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, 
India, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam.129 
Regardless, it is unlikely that the 160 plus signatories of UNCLOS would seek to 
redefine the EEZ issue in favor of China’s interpretation.   
3. Event Timeline 
According to a Pentagon statement released on March 9, 2009, from March 5–8 the 
USNS Impeccable was harassed by six Chinese units, including one PLAN intelligence 
collection ship, a State Oceanographic Administration vessel, two Chinese-flagged 
trawlers from Sanya City, and one maritime patrol reconnaissance aircraft approximately 
75 miles south of Hainan Island.130 The most severe harassment occurred on March 8th, 
when the five Chinese vessels collectively encircled the USNS Impeccable, maneuvering 
aggressively, without due regard for safety and with the specific purpose of restricting the 
USNS Impeccable’s intended movement. 
The incident took shape beginning on March 5, when the USNS Impeccable was 
conducting operations in support of hydrographic research. It should be noted that the 
presence of the Impeccable could be potentially attributed to the continued naval 
infrastructure improvements that have been underway on Hainan Island since 2005, which 
support the forward deployment of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). According to 
Hans M. Kristensen, “the Chinese navy has deployed a Jin-class (Type 094) ballistic 
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missile submarine to a new base near Yulin on Hainan Island on the South China Sea, 
according to a satellite image” obtained February 27, 2008.131 Kristensen adds that “the 
base on Hainan Island is near deep water and some analysts suggest this will support 
submarine patrols better that [sic] operations from the Northern Fleet base at 
Jianggezhuang.”132 Thus, the Impeccable’s routine operations could have potentially 
correlated to the collection of data that supports U.S. Navy’s Anti-Submarine Warfare 
(ASW) patrols, which in turn elicited a response from Chinese authorities. 
The following timeline is derived from the Pentagon’s released statement. On 
March 5, 2009, a Chinese frigate, “without notice or warning” moved to intercept the 
USNS Impeccable while it was conducting routine operations in the South China Sea.133 
The frigate crossed the Impeccable’s bow at the closest point of approach (CPA) of roughly 
100 yards. Following the frigate’s aggressive maneuvers, a Chinese maritime patrol 
reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA), a Y-12, was directed to harass the Impeccable. According 
to the Pentagon statement: “Chinese Y-12 aircraft conduct[ed] 11 fly-bys of Impeccable at 
an altitude of 600 feet and a range from 100–300 feet.”134 The Chinese frigate again crossed 
the bow of the Impeccable, at a CPA of nearly 400–500 yards, without due regard for the 
rules of the road. Of note, on March 4, 2009, the USNS Victorious suffered from similar 
harassment but the aggressors did not include fishing trawlers. 
On March 7, the PRC dispatched an intelligence collection ship (AGI) to challenge 
the Impeccable. The Pentagon reports that the AGI used bridge-to-bridge communications, 
informing the Impeccable that her operations violated international law and directed her to 
leave the operating area or “suffer the consequences.”135 The Impeccable remained on 
station, continuing operations. However, on March 8, the most severe harassment occurred, 
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forcing the USNS Impeccable to leave the area. The Pentagon describes the incidents on 
March 8 as follows: 
Five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in 
dangerously close proximity to USNS Impeccable, in an apparent 
coordinated effort to harass the U.S. ocean surveillance ship while it was 
conducting routine operations in international waters. The Chinese vessels 
surrounded USNS Impeccable, two of them closing to within 50 feet, 
waving Chinese flags and telling Impeccable to leave the area. Because the 
vessels’ intentions were not known, Impeccable sprayed its fire hoses at one 
of the vessels in order to protect itself. The Chinese crewmembers disrobed 
to their underwear and continued closing to within 25 feet. 
USNS Impeccable’s master used bridge-to-bridge radio circuits to inform 
the Chinese ships in a friendly manner that it was leaving the area and 
requested a safe path to navigate. A short time later, two of the PRC vessels 
stopped directly ahead of USNS Impeccable, forcing Impeccable to conduct 
an emergency “all stop” in order to avoid a collision. They dropped pieces 
of wood in the water directly in front of Impeccable’s path.136 
One of the most notable actions committed by the Chinese fishing trawlers was an 
attempt to sever the USNS Impeccable’s undersea towed array. This action is a particularly 
aggressive and heavy-handed tactic for civilian fishermen to attempt. These actions 
delineate these units from typical civilian fishing fleets and reinforce the assertion that they 
were militia units. Furthermore, the trawlers operated from Sanya City, on Hainan Island, 
which is home to the most respected and arguably elite maritime militia units. According 
to Erickson and Kennedy, “one of the trawlers involved, hull number F8399, belonged to 
Fugang Fisheries.”137 They explain that Fugang Fisheries “is itself at the vanguard” of 
militia units and is a “leading participant in … harassment of foreign vessels … in the 
SCS.”138 One can argue that this case was an operational test of potential militia capability 
and their value to escalation control. The presence of the fishermen, who at the time were 
not identified as militia units, were able to exploit two of the primary characteristics of 
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gray zone conflict, ambiguity and asymmetry. The status and tactics of the fishing trawlers 
confused the Impeccable’s captain, who did not know how to respond with limited 
capability was forced to leave the area. Had it been a PRC military unit, attempted the same 
action, there might have been an increased potential for attributing hostile intent to military 
action, leading to escalation or miscalculation.  
The timeline and statement issued by the Pentagon are affirmed by both video and 
pictures collected by the crew of the USNS Impeccable, regardless of Beijing’s 
counterclaims. Furthermore, Jonathan Odom asserts that “the U.S. government was candid, 
clear, and consistent in its factual account of the March 8th incident and provided detailed 
corroboration to the international community; the PRC government, on the other hand, was 
cryptic at best, and misleading at worst.”139 The USNS Impeccable was able to capture 
media that could not be countered, as well as capturing images of fishing trawlers acting 
as maritime militia units, collaborating with PLAN and SOA forces. The fishing trawlers, 
performing maritime militia duties, were responsible for the most serious and dangerous 
activities in March 2009. The militia actions ultimately forced the master of the Impeccable 
to issue the order to leave the area. 
From March 9–12, Washington, DC and Beijing engaged in a series of diplomatic 
exchanges. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu stated in a press conference on 
March 10 that “the U.S. ship [USNS Impeccable] engaged in activities in China’s exclusive 
economic zone without China’s permission, and broke the international law as well as 
Chinese laws and regulations.”140 Chinese claims asserting a violation of jurisdiction due 
to lack of permission is a non-issue, as the activities occurred outside of territorial waters. 
Each government continued with rebuttals until March 12, when the USS Chung-Hoon, a 
modern DDG, was deployed to support the continuation of the Impeccable’s operations in 
the South China Sea. On March 20, the China Daily released an article, based on unnamed 
PLAN sources, that stated, “the Chinese military is ready to call an end to the standoff with 
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the United States in the South China Sea after diplomatic efforts have reduced tensions,”141 
effectively ending the standoff. 
4. Findings and Implications 
First, the 2009 case affirms that maritime militia units can have tremendous 
operational and strategic effect while operating in the gray zone. Erickson and Kennedy 
contend that “the fishing trawlers, although dwarfed by the Impeccable, were successful in 
disrupting the normal operations of the U.S. vessel” for a period of time; however, the 
United State resumed operations as it had done for years before.142 Unable to discern the 
intent of the belligerents, the Impeccable’s master was forced to withdraw from the area. 
The U.S. operational pause in the South China Sea from March 9–15 gave the Chinese 
increased maneuver space to adjust its operational patterns, which subsequently imposed 
increased costs on the U.S. Navy’s operations in the area by adding armed escorts, even if 
for a limited period. 
Second, fishing trawlers in and of themselves do not present a clear and present 
danger. Beijing subsequently shifted the narrative back to enhancing cooperation, only 
after having altered U.S. naval operations for a week. Beijing’s narrative manipulation is 
affirmed by the director of a military thinktank, the China Foundation for International and 
Strategic Studies, Col (ret.) Zhang Tuosheng, who told the China Daily on March 20, 2009, 
that neither party wants the situation to get worse “because both sides have so many areas 
they share interests in.”143 Two days before Zhang’s statement, U.S. Defense Secretary 
Robert Gates also downplayed the incident and championed cooperation. When asked by 
a reporter concerning military-to-military cooperation and the Impeccable incident, 
SECDEF Gates responded by stating, “I would like to see us put this behind us, not have 
another incident like it, and continue that improvement in the relationship.”144 U.S. 
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officials had the opportunity to respond more assertively to Chinese actions and 
employment of proxy forces in the South China Sea; however, D.C. erred on the side of 
caution, favoring dialogue over direct action. Nonetheless, the next patrol was escorted by 
a U.S. warship. 
Third, the use of maritime militias likely supported a broader effort by Beijing and 
Hu Jintao that was designed as a litmus test by which to judge President Obama’s new 
administration and the Pacific Rebalance. When asked if it was a test of U.S. resolve, 
Former National Security Council Director to President Obama, Evan Medeiros, said, “It 
was unclear” and that it is difficult to “attribute agency to its top leaders … But, regardless 
you still have to assume that there is sufficient agency there.”145 The situation did not 
escalate to conflict, and Beijing effectively learned how the United States would respond 
over the next eight years to continued harassment of U.S. forces operating in the area. In 
effect, maritime militias provide Beijing with a low-end kinetic capability to test adversary 
military reactions and diplomatic posturing. The 2009 incident is in effect evidence of a 
gray zone strategy that uses an asymmetric force, the exact motivations of which are 
ambiguous but ultimately serve to alter the environment, complicating the decision-making 
of tactical commanders. Ambiguous and asymmetric gray zone tactics introduce 
uncertainty, resulting in a sort of cognitive dissonance for leaders and commanders. 
B. CASE 2: SCARBOROUGH SHOAL STANDOFF – 2012 
1. Overview 
In April of 2010, Beijing and Manila entered into a two-month confrontation 
concerning the enforcement and administration of Scarborough Shoal. On April 8, the 
Philippines responded to reports of illegal Chinese poaching by deploying its most capable 
warship, the BRP Gregorio del Pillar, to investigate and arrest individuals conducting 
illegal fishing activities. China viewed this as an escalation by the Philippines and 
responded by deploying units that prevented the arrest of Chinese fishermen. Regardless 
                                                 
145 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan Medeiros, “Obama’s Legacy in US-China Relations: A Conversation 
with Evan Medeiros” (Podcast) Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 2016, 
https://soundcloud.com/csis-57169780/obamas-legacy-with-evan-medeiros. 
58 
of China’s perception of escalation, the Philippines had responded in the past to the 
presence of Chinese fishermen using both Navy and Coast Guard vessels. After the initial 
deployment of forces, each side settled into the standoff in an attempt to negotiate a 
resolution. Manila sought support from the international community and regional partners 
in order to broker a deal. Throughout this period though, China escalated the situation via 
economic coercion and continued harassment of Philippine vessels. The deadlock 
eventually ended in late June; however, the resolution failed to restore the status quo, and 
Beijing assumed control of the waters surrounding the shoal in July of 2012. 
2. Contextual Analysis: Claimant Dispute – Beijing vs. Manila 
An essential element of the 2012 standoff is the historical disagreement regarding 
sovereignty and administration of the shoal. Scarborough Shoal, also known as Bajo De 
Masinloc by the Philippines or Huangyan Island by China, is a disputed atoll located in the 
South China Sea. The shoal is located approximately 150 miles west of the Philippines 
within its EEZ and 550 miles southeast of mainland China. The shoal is a historic fishing 
ground for the Philippines but offers little else in other economic value. Dr. Batongbacal, 
of the Institute for Maritime and Ocean Affairs, stresses that 
Data from petroleum exploration and international marine scientific 
research activities have thus far convinced petroleum exploration 
companies that if any petroleum is to be found in the South China Sea, it 
will be in areas closer to the coasts… Contrary to popular perception, 
current Philippine interests in resources there are not about petroleum, but 
rather about more limited fishing interests.146 
Chinese interests in the shoal are connected to international shipping, freedom of 
navigation, and commercial and military air routes. Dr. Batongbacal asserts that “Bajo de 
Masinloc is strategically positioned as a vantage point from which to surveil shipping and 
air traffic in the South China Sea … The fact that Bajo de Masinloc also lies directly 
adjacent to Manila and Subic emphasizes its strategic importance for air and sea 
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navigation.”147 These facts have driven the Chinese to more aggressively pursue 
occupation and administration of the shoal, in conjunction with its maritime expansion. It 
is possible and highly conceivable that China would use the shoal to construct a fixed radar 
site that could potentially close gaps in its maritime domain awareness in the eastern South 
China Sea. Although the shoal has been an issue for many decades, it was not until the 
early 1990s that the atoll became such a flashpoint. 
The United States assumed control of Scarborough Shoal from the Spanish in 
accordance with the 1900 Treaty of Washington; in 1946, the United States recognized the 
shoal’s independence, at which point the Philippines assumed claim. Green asserts that 
“around the same time, in 1947 the Republic of China declared sovereignty over 172 land 
features in the South China Sea following initial map verification work in the mid-1930s. 
This list included Scarborough Shoal (then called Minzhu Reef) as part of what China calls 
the Zhongsha Islands.”148 Regardless of the validity of each nation’s claim, the stage was 
set for an eventual standoff. 
Throughout the 1990s, China routinely directed civilian voyages in attempt to assert 
sovereignty over the features. Manila increased security of the shoal in an attempt to 
maintain sovereignty and resist an increasingly aggressive Beijing. This resulted in the first 
major incident between the Philippines and China in May of 1997. Manila responded to 
the presence of Chinese vessels, preventing access to the shoal and consequently arresting 
21 Chinese fishermen. Following the incident, Manila increased presence patrols and more 
aggressively pursued the arrest of Chinese fishermen. This type of activity is highly 
characteristic of the relationship between China and the Philippines regarding the shoal 
throughout the ‘90s and into the 2000s.149 One of the most notable examples of Chinese 
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aggression during the period was the seizure of Mischief Reef by China in 1994, which is 
within territorial waters claimed by the Philippines.150 
Efforts of regional institutions, such as ASEAN, to manage the disagreement found 
little success. The 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties was in part 
designed to reduce tensions in that signatories agreed not to inhabit features, shoals, or 
islands not presently inhabited. However, according to Joshua Rowan, “the declaration is 
merely a political statement, not a legally binding document. If one party violates a 
provision, there is no method for enforcement.”151 Although it is not unusual for legally 
binding documents not to have an overt enforcement mechanism, the lack of prosecutorial 
authority invites abuse. Continued diplomatic jockeying in the 2000s, along with continued 
incursions by the Chinese into areas surrounding the Shoal, inevitably led to the 2012 
standoff. 
3. Event Timeline 
On April 8, 2012, a Philippine reconnaissance aircraft located eight Chinese fishing 
vessels anchored in a lagoon at Scarborough Shoal. Having identified the Chinese fishing 
vessels, the Philippines directed its largest and most modern warship—the BRP Gregorio 
Del Pillar, which it had purchased the year prior from the United States—to investigate the 
activities of the Chinese fishing vessels. As previously discussed, it is not outside the 
historical operational norms for the Philippines to respond to Chinese fishermen’s presence 
using either Navy or Coast Guard ships. The Philippine’s Department of Foreign Affairs 
said in a statement that “PF-15 confirmed the presence of the eight Chinese fishing vessels 
anchored inside the lagoon of the Shoal. The PN vessel remained in the vicinity of the 
Shoal for continuous monitoring of the fishing vessels.”152 On April 10, sailors of the Pillar 
boarded the fishing vessels and discovered large quantities of illegally poached marine life. 
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Chinese fishermen were found to have illegally poached coral, giant clams, and species of 
sharks, violating Philippine laws.153 After Philippine sailors disembarked the Chinese 
fishing vessels, Chinese fishermen promptly called authorities located on Hainan Island. 
Roel Landingin and Katrin Hille reported that 
 
According to the fishermen, with whom the fisheries officials in Tanmen 
are in constant satellite phone contact, the Philippine warship arrived at 7:30 
am on Tuesday [April 10] and blocked the entrance to the atoll. Twelve 
soldiers entered the 15 fishing vessels and threatened the Chinese 
fishermen, the Tanmen official said. In response to the fishermen’s calls for 
help, China Maritime Surveillance sent two ships which arrived at 1 pm on 
Tuesday.154 
 
Beijing dispatched China Marine Surveillance Ship (CMS) Zhongguo Haijian 75 
and CMS Zhonggou Haijian 84, which subsequently moved to block the entrance of the 
shoal, preventing the Philippine authorities from entering and arresting the fishermen. 
Although both sides report conflicting numbers of Chinese fishing vessels operating in the 
area, Erickson and Kennedy assert that there was a total of 12 vessels: 
 
Six fishing vessels were outside the lagoon at the time, including that of 
Tanmen maritime militia Company Deputy Commander Wang Shumao, 
who led an unsuccessful effort to block Philippine fishing vessels from 
approaching the shoal. The other six fishing vessels present inside the 
lagoon, two of which are confirmed maritime militia vessels, were trapped 
when Philippine forces blocked the lagoon’s opening.155 
Regardless of the exact number of vessels, the fact that two known maritime militia 
vessels along with the deputy commander from Tanmen were on-station is significant. It 
is likely that the militia units were conducting routine fishing activities before the arrival 
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of the BRP Pillar, but upon the Pillar’s arrival militia members recognized the potential of 
the situation and radioed for headquarters. Erickson and Kennedy stress that the 
“Scarborough Shoal incident makes clear, even when Tanmen fishing vessels may be 
operating for private gain, they can be quickly transformed into instruments of state policy 
when the situation calls for it.”156 They add that Wang Shumao, the on-scene commander 
of twelve militia boats “led an effort outside of the shoal to block any Philippine fishing 
vessels from entering the area.”157 Thus the decision to contact Tanmen officials likely 
enabled Beijing to capitalize on what they asserted was an unnecessary escalation by 
Manila. However, Philippine authorities had responded similarly in past circumstances 
concerning the arrest and detainment of Chinese poachers.  
On April 12, following a series of diplomatic exchanges, the Pillar departed 
Scarborough Shoal in a possible attempt to deescalate the situation; however, Philippine 
authorities reported that redeployment was for refitting and refueling the ship.158 
Regardless of Manila’s efforts, Beijing responded by sending a third ship to the shoal. Lt 
General Alcantara, chief of the Northern Luzon Command, reported that the Pillar had been 
relieved by the coast guard ship, BRP Pampanga. While at the same time a third Chinese 
vessel had arrived at the shoal, one from the Fishing Law Enforcement Command 
(FLEC).159 Green asserts that China’s FLEC deployment may have resulted due to poor 
communication on the part of Manila for failing to signal the departure of the Pillar 
properly or could have been a pre-planned reaction.160  However, Beijing and Manila 
continued diplomatic negotiations.   
On April 13, Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario stated in a press 
conference: “We have been able to arrive on some agreements … [and] both sides have 
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agreed not to do anything that would escalate the situation there any further. “161 Later that 
day in what appeared as a step toward de-escalation, CMS 75 and FLEC 303 escorted the 
Chinese fishermen from the area. At such time, Beijing and Manila each had one ship 
remaining on station, the CMS 84 and BRP Pampanga, respectively.   
On April 17, in what Beijing interpreted as an attempt to globalize the issue, Manila 
declared that it would seek international arbitration before the International Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS). In a press conference, Del Rosario declared that “the whole world 
knows that China has myriad more ships and aircraft than the Philippines. At day’s end, 
however, we hope to demonstrate that international law would be the great equalizer.”162 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Weimin responded stating that “Huangyan Island 
is China’s inherent territory. There is no reason to bring it to the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea.”163 Furthermore, researcher Zhu Zhenming of Yunnan Academy of 
Social Sciences contends that the Philippines, on the one hand, stresses its willingness on 
a peaceful solution to the dispute, while on the other hand, tries to make the confrontation 
near the Huangyan Island a multilateral issue … it is killing off possibilities of a peaceful 
solution … [and] reflects the absence of its sincerity.”164 The Philippines’ decision to seek 
legal recourse is the likely consequence of correctly identifying the overwhelming material 
asymmetry its forces faced. 
As a response to Manila’s decision to pursue arbitration, FLEC deployed its largest 
and most capable vessel to relieve CMS 84 and defend ten Chinese fishing vessels 
operating near the shoal. On April 20, the China Daily reported: 
The 2,580-tonne Yuzheng-310 set sail from the southern port city of 
Guangzhou on Wednesday. Its mission is to protect China’s territorial 
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waters and ensure the safety of Chinese fishermen, said a statement released 
by the South China Sea Fishery Bureau under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
‘In the period of time that follows, the ship will go on regular patrols, help 
Chinese fishermen in the area and look into other issues concerning fishing 
activity there.’165 
ASEAN remained relatively quiet throughout the standoff. It appeared that Beijing 
was successful in its efforts to keep the South China Sea issue a bilateral subject, as 
opposed to a multilateral issue that would undermine China’s position. At the annual 
ASEAN summit in May 2012, the SCS disputes ultimately proved too controversial for 
ASEAN states to unify and produce a diplomatic resolution that affirmed the Philippines’ 
position. However, the United States weighed in. A statement from the Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton, said: “No nation can fail to be concerned by the increase in tensions, the 
uptick in confrontational rhetoric and disagreement over resource exploitation.”166 
Regardless of U.S. support, ASEAN failed to unify to resist Beijing’s claims in the SCS, 
which fundamentally shattered any potential that the Philippines would retain the shoal. 
On April 28, as Manila continued efforts to internationalize the issue, Beijing 
moved to reinforce the nine Chinese vessels already operating in the vicinity of the shoal, 
which included CMS 71, CMS 75, and seven fishing vessels. FLEC 310 returned to the 
shoal in an attempt to intimidate the BRP Edsa and BRP Pampanga. Philippine officials 
reported that FLEC 310 maneuvered at a high rate of speed and then rapidly turned to 
generate a two-meter wave that impacted both Philippine vessels. Officials stated that no 
damage resulted and neither Philippine ship responded to the aggressive and unsafe 
maneuver; Beijing denied the accusation.167 However, no further action was taken by either 
disputant following the exchange. 
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On May 2, Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Northern Luzon Command 
(NOLCOM) reported that 14 Chinese vessels, including seven fishing boats were operating 
near the shoal compared to five Philippine ships, including one Coast Guard vessel, one 
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel, and three fishing boats. NOLCOM 
described the situation as follows: 
Edsa II was 1.4 nautical miles (2.52 kilometers) northeast off the shoal’s 
South Rock. The CMS 71 was 13.6 nautical miles (24.4 km) away from 
Edsa II; the CMS 81, 11.9 nautical miles (21.42 km) away; and the CMS 
75, only 3.3 nautical miles (5.94 km) away. China’s FLEC 310 was just 8.3 
nautical miles (14.94 km) away from Edsa II.168 
NOLCOM Chief, Lieutenant General Anthony Alcantara, affirmed the Philippines’ 
commitment to maintaining sovereignty, stating that the military was determined to 
“protect territorial integrity.”169 Over the next week, Beijing began applying economic 
pressures in an attempt to bring the standoff to an end.  
First, China targeted the Philippine banana industry, enacting a quarantine due to 
the alleged presence of mealybugs found in shipments dating back to March of 2012. 
ProMusa, a Biodiversity International funded group, reported that in “2012, the exports 
from the Philippines made up 98% of the Asian banana trade. Two-thirds of the exported 
volumes were shipped to Japan, China, and South Korea.”170 Manila attempted to 
downplay the economic effects of the banana quarantine imposed by its third largest export 
partner. Arsenio Balisacan, the Economic Planning Secretary, stated that “as of now, we 
are likely to see modest effects on the economy, but we need to intensify our efforts to 
diversify our trade with other countries, so whether or not this event with China occurred, 
we should have been diversifying our exports.”171 China’s ability to selectively target 
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industry vital to hundreds of thousands of farmers in the Philippines undermined Manila 
officials’ efforts and resolve to resist China’s assertive actions. 
Second, Beijing targeted the tourist industry, due to what they claimed was the 
result of protests in Manila that made travel unsafe for Chinese citizens. Again, Philippine 
officials downplayed the potential impact of the travel ban. Tourism Undersecretary Ma 
Victoria Jasmin stated that this “obstacle is temporary, and we can and must overcome.”172 
However, according to reporting, “China is the 4th largest market for tourists in the 
Philippines behind Korea, the United States, and Japan.”173  As a result of the economic 
coercion, He Kai found that the “Philippines lost approximately $34 million from banana 
exports and the cost to tourism was almost $1 million.”174  It is plausible that the 
Philippines could temporarily absorb one of the economic constraints; however, the 
combination of multiple coercive economic tactics made it less likely that Manila could 
endure the economic losses. 
During this period, the Philippine Foreign Minister reported that China had 
continued to expand its presence at the shoal as of May 22. Del Rosario told reporters that 
the units included five PRC vessels, 16 fishing boats, and 76 utility boats (dinghies).175  
Chinese spokesman Hong Lei countered and responded, stating that is “the way they 
operate, [it] is in compliance with the relevant laws in China, as well as China’s fishing 
moratorium order.”176 That moratorium is a reference to the annual fishing ban imposed 
by China in the South China Sea, which includes the shoal. As a response to China’s ban, 
the Philippines issued a ban and formally declared that it does not recognize Beijing’s 
moratorium. On May 16, Del Rosario announced: 
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We do not recognize China’s fishing ban in as much as portions of the ban 
encompass our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). However, the president 
has decided that in view of the accelerated depletion of our marine 
resources, it would be advisable for us to issue our own fishing ban for a 
period of time to replenish our fish stock.177 
China ignored the Philippines’ fishing ban and continued to permit Chinese fishing 
in accordance with what it deemed was in keeping with its domestic law. Additionally, 
Chinese vessels prohibited Philippine fishermen from accessing the shoal, although, 
Philippine fishermen were already hesitant to return to the shoal given the sheer number of 
Chinese vessels present and a potential threat posed by those forces. Hong Lei stated that 
China’s position was in response to the Philippines’ “provocative actions” and that China 
was simply using “corresponding measures to strengthen management and control” of the 
shoal.178 By this time in the standoff, the Philippines had effectively ceded control of the 
shoal to China.  
China and the Philippines each began withdrawing vessels in mid-June due 
reportedly to the coming typhoon season. Philippine ships were first to depart the area; Del 
Rosario stated that “when the weather improves, a re-evaluation will be made.”179 Hong 
Lei responded that “we hope there will continue to be an easing in the situation, and hope 
bilateral cooperation will recover and be safeguarded.”180 However, a body of information 
indicates that the planned withdrawal was the consequence of U.S. intervention. Ely Ratner 
contends that “U.S. officials in mid-June brokered what they thought was a deal for a 
mutual withdrawal. Exhausted, outnumbered and lacking viable alternatives, Manila 
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withdrew its remaining ships under the face-saving auspices of an oncoming typhoon.”181 
Ratner adds that “China, on the other hand, failed to comply with the agreed-upon deadline 
and retained its maritime vessels at the shoal.”182  Regardless, by July 2012, bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic mechanisms failed to restore the status quo ante bellum.   
China had effectively achieved control of the shoal, so in its self-interest, it made 
sense to bring the dispute to an end before it indeed became a multilateral conflict. During 
this time, President Aquino went on a world tour, mainly with the aim of developing 
support in the resistance of Chinese claims for a shoal that was within the Philippines’ 
EEZ. Diplomatic exchanges, which included the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
ASEAN partners, failed to produce a resolution that returned the shoal to the Philippines 
or to ensure the permanent departure of Chinese vessels from the shoal. 
As of June 2018, China is still in control of Scarborough. Philippine fishermen 
continue to report a large number of Chinese vessels operating in the area, which grant 
only limited access to Philippine vessels. Philippine Presidential Spokesperson Harry 
Roque has attempted to downplay the issue given friendly relations under the current 
Duterte administration. Roque stated, “China should discipline its rotten coast guard 
personnel. This is not acceptable, [but] I would not say it was harassment. You know what 
harassment is? During the time of President Aquino.”183 Given the Philippines’ political 
and military disadvantage, as well as a lack of regional support, the Chinese have expertly 
executed a fait accompli using maritime militias to exercise control and resource 
management. 
4. Findings and Implications 
First, the Scarborough Shoal standoff represents the validation of China’s echelon 
defense strategy, which is a model by which the Chinese can impose sovereignty over the 
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South China Sea. Cheng Chunfa, the head of CMS operations in the South China Sea, 
stated that the standoff represented a “new model … [in the] rights-protection struggle.”184 
The model is built in part on the employment of maritime militias, leveraging the 
asymmetric advantage resulting from the operationalization of its fishing fleet. The 
advantage is having units widely dispersed and in place throughout the South China Seas 
that can be rapidly activated into state actors. The ambiguity should give states pause for 
concern when deciding to interdict Chinese fishermen conducting routine economic 
activities. China’s decade-long modernization campaign has resulted in an entire maritime 
component that includes maritime militias, which has rapidly expanded its ability to 
communicate and disseminate information quickly. Martinson stresses that the “resource 
gap is exacerbated by the nature of the maritime arena, where a great advantage accrues to 
states that have the wherewithal to keep more forces at sea.”185 Maritime militias 
interspersed throughout the SCS affords China with additional forces in the maritime arena, 
thereby reducing the resource gap. Thus, China’s material power advantage has created an 
environment in which leaders now can more rapidly observe, orient, decide, and act, 
compared to materially deficient regional states.   
Second, evidenced by Beijing’s handling of the standoff, maritime militias are a 
force with which Beijing can judge the relative resolve and commitment of regional states 
and possible international support. China’s case for intervention on behalf of the Chinese 
fishermen was based in part on the fact that the fishermen’s rights were violated and the 
Philippines overreacted by sending its largest warship rather than a coast guard vessel, 
which it had done in previous encounters. The arrival of the BRP Pillar likely provided 
Beijing with the necessary impetus to respond with force that could conclusively establish 
control of the shoal. Although military and law enforcement vessels were involved, Beijing 
could push a narrative that it was only responding to Philippine aggression that was both 
unnecessary and unwarranted. 
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Furthermore, by Beijing focusing on the legal issue of fishing rights and using its 
extensive fishing fleet as an instrument of state power, China can seemingly overwhelm 
regional states’ capacities to resist China’s incremental gains. The maritime militias enable 
China to remove or reduce the military component of a situation that might otherwise rise 
to kinetic conflict, which might result in the formation of a multilateral coalition to confront 
China. Ian Bowers contends that “low–level or tactical interactions at sea generally do not 
have an impact on the broader strategic picture.”186 The case is reflective of Bowers’ 
assertion, indicating that regional states and international partners were not 
overwhelmingly compelled to support Philippine claims, regardless of the potential 
consequence of ceding territory and the precedent it would set. As a result, Erickson asserts 
that “Beijing is certain to continue to wield its third sea force as a tool of choice to probe 
and apply pressure.”187 Therefore, one can conclude that China learned a valuable lesson 
in 2012: by limiting the military component of a crisis during a peacetime dispute over an 
issue that arguably violates international law, Beijing can expect relatively little resistance 
and almost no consequence. 
C. CASE 3: CHINA-VIETNAM HAIYANG SHIYOU 981 OIL RIG 
STANDOFF – 2014 
1. Overview 
In May 2014, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) deployed 
Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY-981) exploratory oil rig to waters off of Vietnam, in an area 
that has been contested by both states for centuries. The rig arrived in an area approximately 
70 miles inside of Vietnam’s EEZ and approximately 20 miles south of the Chinese-held 
Triton Island in the Paracel Islands archipelago. HYSY-981 was escorted by a Chinese 
flotilla, sent from the Guangzhou Military Region and Hainan Military District commands. 
Vietnam responded by sending out a contingent of vessels to defend its territorial integrity. 
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Over the next two months, Chinese and Vietnamese vessels would have numerous 
encounters at sea, including the ramming and sinking of Vietnamese vessels. In addition to 
the violence at sea, Vietnamese citizens mobilized in Hanoi to protest Chinese aggression 
and went as far as setting fire to Chinese factories. On July 15, Beijing withdrew the rig 
one month earlier than had been announced, bringing the standoff to a close. 
2. Contextual Analysis: Claimant Dispute – Beijing vs. Hanoi 
The Paracel Island chain, also known as Xisha Islands by China and the Hoang Sa 
Archipelago by Vietnam, is a group of approximately 130 coral islands and reefs in the 
northwest area of the South China Sea. The archipelago is divided into two main groups, 
the northeastern Amphitrite Group, and the western Crescent Group. The island chain 
spans an area of approximately 15,000 square miles and is equidistant for China and 
Vietnam. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam currently claim it; however, at present, the chain is 
firmly in Chinese control.   
In recent years the conflict over the island chain has been attributed to the potential 
extraction of oil and natural gas. However, U.S. Energy Information Administration 
analysis finds that 
Most fields containing discovered oil and natural gas are clustered in 
uncontested parts of the South China Sea, close to shorelines of the coastal 
countries, and not near the contested islands. Industry sources suggest 
almost no oil and less than 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas in proved 
and probable reserves exist in fields near the Spratly Islands. The Paracel 
Island territory has even less natural gas and no oil.188 
Given the limited potential for resource extraction, the island group is more 
representative of the struggle of regional states to resist China’s expansion and control of 
the South China Sea. China and Vietnam each claim a historical right to the area dating 
back hundreds of years, and, in the case of the Chinese, to the Han Dynasty. More recently 
though, the issue of control can be traced back to 1945 and the end of World War II. 
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Following the withdraw of Japanese forces from the archipelago, the two major 
island groups were divided. French-Vietnamese forces were left in control of the Crescent 
Group and the Republic of China was given control of the Amphitrite Group. In 1951, 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai declared that the PRC had sovereignty over the Paracels and 
Spratly Islands groups. In 1958, Beijing reaffirmed that claim of sovereignty. Fravel 
stresses that “the 1958 declaration marked the first time that China linked its claims to 
territorial sovereignty with the assertion of maritime rights, in this case, rights to territorial 
waters.”189 China has since built a domestic legal framework with which to further its 
claims and has adopted UNCLOS in an attempt to legitimize its claims. In 1974, China 
entirely wrested control of the Paracel Islands following the most significant naval battle 
in PRC history to date, defeating South Vietnamese forces. Although relatively minor 
clashes have occurred since 1974, China has remained in control of the archipelago. 
Vietnam has never abandoned its claims, but since the mid-90s has attempted to 
work both bilaterally with China and multilaterally with the regional and international 
community to develop a framework for cooperation and cohabitation. In 2002, China, 
Vietnam, and other ASEAN states affirmed a non-binding resolution—the Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea—in an attempt to further cooperation and 
promote stability. Since 2002, Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to improve and 
expand; according to the China Daily, “by the end of 2002, China had invested more than 
230 projects in Vietnam, with its contractual value exceeding US$ 0.37 billion. Its 
investment mainly covered machinery and electrical product-assembling, food-processing 
and real estate.”190 Furthermore, according to Green, “Beijing and Hanoi … agreed to … 
regular joint patrols, a joint fisheries survey, [and] joint hydrocarbon exploration.”191  
Regardless of bilateral cooperation, conflict at sea concerning the Paracels has remained a 
point of contention. 
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For example, in 2007, Hanoi deployed a contingent of auxiliary vessels with the 
purpose of expelling a Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) survey vessel 
from the contested waters in the Western Paracel Island group. The Chinese responded, 
directing two CMS vessels to the area to confront the fleet of Vietnamese auxiliary vessels. 
During the standoff, the CMS vessels maneuvered aggressively in order to maintain a 
cordon area, first shouldering the Vietnamese vessels and then escalated to ramming.192 
The incident in 2007 is illustrative of the continued conflict that exists between the two 
claimants and China’s continued efforts to exercise control over the South China Sea.  
3. Event Timeline 
The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that on May 1, 2014, 
Vietnamese authorities discovered HYSY-981, along with three support vessels, operating 
in Vietnam’s EEZ, approximately 20 nautical miles south of Triton Island (long-held by 
China, but approximately 120 nautical miles from the coast of Vietnam).193  Vietnamese 
officials protested the arrival of the oil rig in waters that were apparently in Vietnam’s 
EEZ. Vietnamese foreign ministry spokesman Le Hai Binh demanded “that China drop its 
drilling plans and move it out of the area.”194 Meanwhile, Vietnam deployed many 
Vietnamese Coast Guard and Fisheries Resources Surveillance vessels to defend 
Vietnamese territorial integrity. Reporting indicated that Vietnam deployed as many as 29 
naval and coast guard ships by May 6; interpreted by one Chinese diplomat, it was a “show 
of force” that sought to compel China’s withdrawal from the area.195 The two naval flotillas 
met at sea and almost immediately began harassing one another. 
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The Foreign Ministry in Hanoi reported that “on May 4, Chinese ships intentionally 
rammed two Vietnamese Sea Guard vessels,”196 resulting in damage to equipment and 
injuries to personnel. Tran Duy Hai, a Foreign Ministry official and deputy head of 
Vietnam’s national border committee, told reporters that “Chinese ships, with air support, 
sought to intimidate Vietnamese vessels. Water cannon was used.”197 While each side 
pursued diplomatic recourses in an attempt to manage escalation, encounters at sea proved 
violent, and Vietnam’s resistance indicated an increased willingness to accept the risk. 
However, neither side was overwhelmingly willing to walk back their assertions of 
territorial sovereignty. On May 6, Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh had a 
teleconference with Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, stressing that “China’s unilateral 
bringing of the rig and a large number of vessels, including military ships … is illegal and 
runs counter to international law and practice … [and] negatively impacts political trust 
and cooperation.”198 From Beijing’s perspective Hanoi has attempted the similar unilateral 
exploration in the South China Sea; however, China has state power an order of magnitude 
greater with which to dissuade Vietnamese exploratory operations. 
During this period, the U.S. State Department expressed its concern over the 
situation. U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki stated: “We call on all parties to 
conduct themselves safely and appropriately, exercise restraint, and address competing 
sovereignty claims peacefully, diplomatically, and in accordance with international 
law.”199 China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded to the United 
States, asserting “the United States has no right to complain about China’s activities within 
the scope of its sovereignty.”200 Regardless of China’s dismissal of U.S. concern, Vietnam 
received significantly more regional and international diplomatic support than the 
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Philippines had received in 2012. An international consortium of states, including members 
of ASEAN, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, and India, all expressed 
concern with China’s unilateral approach in the South China Sea. 
On May 10, Vietnamese citizens started to organize and began to protest Chinese 
actions in the South China Sea. By May 14, nearly 20,000 protestors took to the streets of 
Ho Chi Minh City in what mostly started as peaceful protests.201 However, smaller groups 
of citizens took more direct action, looting and destroying Chinese-owned businesses in 
the industrial parks of the city. On May 15, protestors attacked a Taiwanese steel mill, 
setting fire to buildings, killing 16 reportedly Chinese nationals, 5 Vietnamese, and injuring 
nearly 100 people.202 The government responded in an attempt to quell the riots, detaining 
more than 600 people. However, Chinese nationals fearing additional reprisals began 
fleeing Vietnam en masse.  
While at sea, China continued to reinforce the oil rig defense, sending additional 
vessels and aircraft to support the expanded cordon area, which had been increased from 
5–7 nautical miles to 10–15 nautical miles. On May 11, the Vietnamese Coast Guard 
reported that Chinese military aircraft had started harassing Vietnamese vessels, flying 
approximately 800 to 1,000 meters over the top of them.203 On May 13, sea police forces 
of the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense said China had dispatched as many 86 
ships to escort the HYSY-981. According to ministry reporting, that included the frigate 
Jinhua (534), submarine Wanning (786), 32 law enforcement vessels, four surveillance 
vessels, two political ships, seven medical vessels, 19 transport ships, one oil tanker, and 
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15 fishing vessels.204 Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung asserted that “this 
extremely dangerous action has been directly endangering peace, stability, security, and 
marine safety in the East Vietnam Sea.”205 Throughout this period, Vietnam reported 
numerous attempts by Chinese vessels to ram Vietnamese ships; additionally, they reported 
damage caused by high-powered water cannons, as the United States had reported in the 
Impeccable case. 
The maritime militias deployed to support the oil rig defense were dispatched from 
Hainan Island. According to Erickson and Kennedy, Tanmen Maritime Militia Company 
Deputy Commander Wang Shumao “led ten of the company’s militia vessels and 200 
militiamen to the platform’s location south of Triton Island to block Vietnamese attempts 
to disrupt the platform’s operations.”206 Erickson and Kennedy assert that during the 
entirety of the dispute, “Sanya’s Maritime Militia contributed 29 fishing vessels to the oil 
rig’s defense. This number, combined with the ten sent by the Tanmen militia, correlates 
closely with Vietnamese estimates of the number of Chinese fishing vessels present.”207 
Erickson and Kennedy stress that “the sheer scale of the ‘rights protection’ … was surely 
unprecedented for new units and the more experienced Tanmen Maritime Militia alike.”208 
The incorporation of the militia units into an armada of this size indicates China’s 
commitment to maintaining a force that significantly frustrates adversaries’ reactions. 
From May 14–25, various diplomatic exchanges occurred; however, discussions 
brought about no significant mechanism for deescalating the situation. On May 26, 
maritime activities escalated when a Chinese fishing vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese 
fishing boat. A reported 40 Chinese vessels had surrounded a much smaller group of 
Vietnamese boats, an obvious intimidation tactic. Video evidence shows a much larger 
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Chinese fishing vessel (11209) pursuing a Vietnamese fishing boat, subsequently ramming 
it and causing it to capsize and sink.209 Vietnamese news reported that “the latest images 
recorded by Vietnamese fishermen … serve as irrefutable evidence of the inhumane actions 
of China against Vietnamese fishermen.”210 The images captured show a much larger steel-
hulled Chinese fishing vessel ramming the significantly smaller Vietnamese fishing boat. 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, “In these seas, China’s ships were in 
a defensive mode ... who was it who took the initiative for the clash? Who was it who 
created tension on the scene? This is very clear.”211  The next day, China relocated the rig 
to the northeast and began phase two of drilling, which was reported to last until August.  
On June 6, the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense newspaper, People’s 
Army, reported that China had between 110 and 115 vessels on station, which included 
“35-40 coast guard vessels, 30 transport ships and tugboats, 35–40 ‘fishing vessels,’ and 
four naval ships,”212 working to enforce the cordon around HYSY-981. The PRC Embassy 
in Hanoi stated that as of June 7, “there were as many as 63 Vietnamese vessels in the area 
at the peak, attempting to break through China’s cordon and ramming the Chinese 
government ships for a total of 1,416 times.”213 The embassy insisted that these actions 
were “serious infringements upon China’s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction, 
[and] grave threats to the safety.”214 With each side at an impasse, China sent state 
councilor Yang Jiechi to hold meetings with Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Pham Binh Minh on June 8. To date, these were the most senior-level meetings 
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between the two states since the standoff began. However, the dialogue produced no 
meaningful resolution.  
On July 15, one month ahead of its declared timeline, HYSY-981 was redeployed 
away from the disputed waters. Chinese officials reported the redeployment was in part 
due to the on-setting typhoon season, as well as confirmation that oil and gas were in 
another area. China declared that the removal was not the result of diplomatic pressure, 
and it remained firm in its commitment to exploring the waters. China’s Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Hong Lei stated that China had not accepted U.S. intervention following U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which had occurred the week before. Hong told 
reporters that “We hope that countries outside the region strictly maintain neutrality, clearly 
distinguish right from wrong, and substantially respect the concerted efforts of the 
countries in the region to safeguard regional peace and stability.”215 The standoff ended 
without escalating into a broader military action and, like the Philippine standoff in 2012, 
ended without any enduring consequence for China nor harm for Vietnam. 
4. Findings and Implications 
 First, the 2014 Oil Rig standoff marks the largest deployment of maritime 
militias to date. Given China’s rapid ability to respond with overwhelming forces, one can 
infer that Beijing was ready for the potential outcome and had prepared its navy, coast 
guard, and militia forces for the likely scenario at sea. It is clear that a line can be drawn 
from 2009 to 2014 that indicates a significant improvement in tactics, techniques, and 
procedures, which has substantially improved the offensive capability of maritime militias. 
Furthermore, maintaining maritime domain awareness over a space of approximately 200 
square nautical miles and more than a hundred vessels operating nearby requires 
tremendous coordination and communication capability. Therefore, China’s investment in 
maritime mobilization starting in the early 2000s has generated a windfall return in its 
ability to subversively project power in the maritime domain. 
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Second, these modernization factors—training, naval force integration, and 
communication—have combined to make China’s maritime militias a potent force 
multiplier for any adversary to engage, manage, or compete with on the open seas. At the 
very least, the sheer number of militia units present during the incident made direct 
engagement with CMS and MLE vessels significantly more difficult, contributing to 
China’s ability to manage the situation, arguably reducing the risk of the dispute breaching 
the threshold of war. Beijing’s decision to place maritime militias on the outer-most layer 
of defense was a calculated maneuver that significantly contributed to China’s ability to 
manage escalation. The maritime militias effectively defended CMS and MLE vessels, thus 
reducing the risk of CMS and MLE vessels engaging with the considerably smaller 
Vietnamese vessels that might have otherwise escalated the conflict. The underlying goal 
of Beijing is to ensure that these disputes remain bilateral competitions as opposed to 
regional multilateral conflicts. Beijing learned from 2009 and 2012 that maritime militias 
could be an instrumental component with which to manage escalation while, at the same 
time, advancing their control of the South China Sea. 
Third, the case brings to bear a critical conclusion regarding states competing with 
belligerent revisionist powers in the maritime domain: when states are compelled to act in 
defense of their territorial claims against any adversary—asymmetric or state-sanctioned—
they must do so with a significantly higher risk-acceptance threshold. States must be 
prepared to escalate the conflict, forcing or, at the very least, inducing the belligerent to 
analyze the value of the object and decide whether kinetic action is necessary to attain it. 
The Vietnamese were overwhelmingly outgunned, outmaneuvered, and outmanned; 
however, the government and citizens remained steadfast in their commitment to defend 
their sovereignty. An argument can be made that the actions of Vietnam’s leaders and its 
dedicated maritime force prompted Beijing leadership to redeploy the oil rig one month 
ahead of the announced timeline. 
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V. COUNTERING MARITIME MILITIAS IN THE GRAY ZONE 
A. CONCLUSION 
The thesis research finds that China’s gray zone strategies, which include the 
operationalization of its fishing fleet into a paramilitary militia at sea, have made little 
impact on international relations. Its gray zone tactics and units have not generated an 
outcome to date that gives China complete or total control of the South China Sea but 
instead have advanced PRC claims with limited reprisals either regional or internationally. 
Regardless of whether the region or globe affirms China’s claims, the PRC has long had 
de facto control of features and portions of the South China Sea. The findings of this thesis 
support a conclusion that China is attempting to master the gray zone as it advances its 
claims of maritime sovereignty. The inclusion of maritime militias is an important element 
that increases PRC maritime domain awareness and reinforces the PLAN and Coast Guard. 
Maritime militias have proven to be a useful instrument with which to frustrate adversaries’ 
traditional response mechanisms. Gregory Poling stresses, “the numbers of militia vessels 
operating in the area on behalf of China is much larger and more persistent than is generally 
understood.”216 Although China has been transparent in its proclamations concerning the 
importance of the maritime domain and its ambitions to control the South China Sea, its 
actions have proceeded at a pace against which the region and the international community 
has largely failed to coalesce and counter. 
Maritime militias are definitively one component of Beijing’s incremental strategy 
to exert control over a geostrategic location that is a vital economic component both 
regionally and globally. Militias have proven to Beijing that their use is not likely to result 
in a conflict beyond PRC control, giving China a force with which to conduct low-level 
probes that test adversary resolve. The maritime militias are not units that will enable China 
to assume control of the South China Sea in a single dispute or conflict. However, that is 
the strength of China’s maritime strategy. China does not need to win every battle to win 
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the war at sea. Instead, Beijing needs to continue to gradually assert dominion over the 
South China Sea, leveraging its significantly greater material power to exhaust the capacity 
of regional states to respond. Brahma Chellaney contends that this incremental “approach 
severely limits rival states’ options by confounding their deterrence plans and making it 
difficult for them to devise proportionate or effective counter-measures.”217 An 
incremental-revisionist state, like China, calculates that its adversaries are either unwilling 
or unable to respond to what in totality could equate to a seismic shift in regional power 
structures.  
PRC naval forces have modernized and expanded at an exponential rate in the last 
20 years. China has leveraged all three of its navies—PLAN, Coast Guard, and maritime 
militias— to expand and enhance its maritime presence. The sheer size of China’s naval 
forces gives the state an overwhelming asymmetric advantage. When compared with 
regional states like Vietnam and the Philippines, the gap in quantity and quality of 
equipment and personnel is extreme. The material imbalance is one aspect of China’s 
asymmetric advantage that is predicated on the entirety of China’s naval forces. However, 
the maritime militias draw on the additional advantage of being only one of two maritime 
militias in the world. Except for Vietnam, no other nation has a maritime proxy force that 
can, in an instant, shift from routine economic activities to instruments of national power 
and gray zone coercion, forming the first line of defense in maritime disputes. Therefore, 
when regional actors encounter Chinese fishing trawlers, they must assume that they are 
dealing with maritime militias.   
The inability of states to rapidly identify maritime militia units contributes to a lack 
of information precision. The resulting ambiguity complicates commanders’ decision-
making, who lack the necessary capabilities and procedures to respond to civilians acting 
as militia units. The normative violation of the principle of distinction between combatants 
and civilians is a critical aspect of the ambiguity imposed by the employment of proxy 
forces. Maritime militias thus act as a non-military unit of escalation, the actions of which 
                                                 




are not likely to result in a breach of the threshold of war. However, because the maritime 
militias are backed by the PLA Navy and Coast Guard, they are more likely to precipitate 
an action that could effectuate an enduring change in the status quo in favor of Beijing; the 
Scarborough Shoal in 2012 is one example. Maritime militia activities are, therefore, 
inherently subversive and destabilizing. As Thomas Schelling explains, subversive 
activities are themselves “ambiguous because the activity is complex, ill-defined, and hard 
to observe or attribute.”218 For all of the impact of China’s maritime militias on 
international relations and their ability to frustrate adversary decision making, the maritime 
militias have drawn no consequences that would disrupt China’s control of the region.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Accept Risk in Great Power Competition  
In order to deter China’s gray zone coercion and its maritime militias, the United 
States must adopt a more assertive posture in the South China Sea, accepting a greater risk 
of escalation that could result in military conflict. China’s gray zone coercion and use of 
proxy forces undermine U.S. security commitments and could limit the United States’ 
access to vital economic regions of the world. Maintaining access in the Pacific maritime 
commons and bolstering security commitments are both critical to U.S. national security, 
requiring a more persistent and aggressive U.S. Naval force backed by political leadership 
that is willing to impose restraints on Chinese maritime claims. It is important to consider 
that if the United States wants to succeed in the returning era of Great Power competition, 
then it must have and demonstrate that there exists a credible deterrent to China’s gray zone 
strategy. The United States must make the South China Seas an issue of national security 
equal to the importance placed on it by China. As Ngo Di Lan asserts, “the United States 
can respond effectively to gray zone tactics when core American interests are at stake. 
Thus, the key issue in the SCS is a lack of U.S. willingness to confront China.”219 
Therefore, after two decades of irregular warfare, U.S. security practitioners should not 
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abandon their dualistic concepts of war and peace. Rather, they should embrace that 
conflict is indeed a range of state activities that must be met with credible deterrence along 
the entirety of the spectrum. 
U.S. actions in the South China Sea to date have not presented any overwhelming 
risk to Beijing’s long-term fait accompli tactics or to its naval forces operating in the area. 
The 2014 HYSY-981 oil rig dispute is evidence, albeit limited, that when China is 
confronted by an adversary willing to accept greater risk, it will withdraw forces counter 
to its stated goals. Thus, one could conclude that China’s low-level probes necessitate 
reciprocal actions by countering forces that are both greater in proportion and risk 
tolerance. However, this requires that the countering state views the Chinese aggression as 
a hostile action that directly undermines the nations’ sovereignty and national security. 
Other than Freedom of Navigation operations and rescinding China’s invitation to 
RIMPAC in 2018, U.S. policymakers have been unwilling to counter Chinese contestation 
in the South China Sea and the use of proxy forces. The failure to frame the contest as a 
national security threat is an affirmation that the U.S. is unwilling to assume a higher risk 
in the hypercompetitive maritime environment. 
2. Create a Coalition at Sea – Combined Task Force (CTF) Pacific 
One of the first steps that the United States could take to assert itself in the South 
China Sea and to combat maritime militias would be to establish a Combined Task Force 
(CTF) naval component in the Pacific—CTF 170—similar to CTF 150. CTF 150 is a 
multinational task force conducting operations in the United States Central Command 
(USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) to counter “terrorist organizations and 
their related illegal activities by restricting their freedom of maneuver in the maritime 
domain.”220 More broadly, the task force is conducting maritime security operations 
(MSO) “under international maritime law and international maritime conventions to help 
ensure security and safety in international waters. This ensures that all commercial shipping 
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can operate freely while transiting the region.”221  The multinational effort has included 
sixteen different countries, and leaders of the CTF rotate every four months among the 
participating nations. Creating CTF 170 could be the first step in drawing in partner-
nations, which could generate the necessary inertia to create a binding code of conduct for 
the South China Sea. 
The United States Navy to date has found success and willing partners through 
various bilateral and multilateral training exercises and operations like Cooperation Afloat 
Readiness and Training (CARAT), Southeast Asia Cooperation Training (SEACAT) and 
RIMPAC. The U.S. Navy reported that 2018 marked the 24th year of CARAT exercises, 
which have brought together a “dozen ally and partner nations including Bangladesh, 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste 
and Vietnam.”222  The U.S. Navy stresses that the “Maritime exercises conducted … are 
designed to address the full spectrum of maritime operations with CARAT focusing on 
maritime security operations and SEACAT on information sharing and maritime domain 
awareness.”223  Additionally, in 2016, the United States worked to establish the Southeast 
Asia Maritime Security Initiative (MSI), which addressed key aspects of maritime domain 
awareness, established a common operating picture, and increased capacity building with 
under-resourced states like the Philippines and Vietnam.224  As valuable as these exercises 
and initiatives have proven to be in building partner-nation capacity, the establishment of 
a “CTF 170” would be an enduring year-long operation. Regardless of the importance of 
capacity building, presence at sea in the contested areas of the South China Sea is a 
paramount factor in the deterrence of Chinese maritime coercion.  
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Given the geostrategic and economic value of the South China Sea, one could 
expect that participation in this newly created multinational force would likely necessitate 
global participation. A security organization of this potential magnitude would 
undoubtedly invite the interest of Beijing, which should be incorporated as well. The 
creation of a CTF in the Pacific should not be presented as a containment strategy but, 
rather, as a way to advance the principles embedded in UNCLOS. By bringing China into 
the fold of the maritime forces, it would be bound to additional rules and norms that would 
enhance cooperation while simultaneously undermining the use of maritime militias. If 
China chooses not to participate, then it would suffer reduced influence and reputation. The 
creation of CTF 170 could reduce the gray zone space that China can manipulate, 
diminishing its capacity to challenge and coerce its neighbors unilaterally. 
3. Strengthen Institutions – Safeguard Against Chinese Assertiveness 
The United States should ratify UNCLOS, becoming the standard bearer of the laws 
and principles embedded in the convention. Moore and Schachte stress that the “most 
compelling reasons that support U.S. adherence to the Convention are rooted in restoring 
U.S. oceans leadership, protecting national interests and enhancing U.S. foreign policy.”225 
By ratifying UNCLOS, the United States would signal to the rest of the world that it 
remains a global leader and supporter of international rules-based conventions. Although 
the United States has adhered to its own interpretation of UNCLOS as a principle of 
custom, it is time that political leaders advance U.S. interest by adopting the internationally 
recognized Law of the Sea. Ben Cardin asserts: “our failure to ratify the treaty … 
undermines our ability to fully work with our allies and partners in the South China Sea 
region. If we are not party to UNCLOS, it is difficult for the United States to rely on the 
treaty to determine the legal entitlements of mid-ocean features, which claims are lawful, 
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and what exactly constitutes the high seas.”226 Combatting gray zone tactics and the 
ambiguity imposed by maritime militias requires collective action. 
In terms of altering China’s maritime behavior, Fuchs and Sutton state that joining 
UNCLOS would, at the very least, “deprive Beijing of its talking point that U.S. 
exhortations to claimant states to comply with UNCLOS amount to ‘hypocrisy.’”227 
Joining UNCLOS is not a panacea that will resolve the South China Sea disputes or 
displace the presence of maritime proxy forces, but it can be an essential first step in 
signaling U.S. commitment to our partners and allies in the region. Moore and Schachte 
add that “adhering to the convention will finally give the United States an opportunity to 
officially declare its views as to the correct operation of convention provisions.”228 
Ratifying UNCLOS could give the United States a powerful component with which to 
reinforce partners and allies, safeguarding against Chinese assertiveness. 
4. Evolve U.S. Military Tactics, Training, and Procedures – For the 
Gray 21st Century  
U.S. military leadership should rapidly advance the doctrinal revision timelines in 
order to reflect gray zone coercion as a threat to national security. The military is one of 
the most critical elements of the gray zone fight. It is mission critical that leaders up and 
down the chain of command understand that in the era of Great Power competition the 
battle for influence and authority will most likely be won below the threshold of war. 
However, this paradigm shift must not be limited to the military and should be undertaken 
by all levels of government authority, from the Joint Force to the interagency. This idea is 
captured in the 2018 Joint Concept of Integrated Campaigning (JCIC) released by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, which states that 
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That operating environment presents the Department of Defense (DoD) 
with a difficult military challenge: develop a methodology, with associated 
capabilities, that enables the Joint Force to collaborate and synchronize with 
interorganizational partners and conduct globally integrated operations to 
achieve acceptable and sustainable outcomes. Furthermore, any solution to 
the military challenge must account for several additional factors: the 
complexity of the environment; interactions with adaptive adversaries; the 
persistence of  enduring competitions; transregional challenges; emerging 
patterns of competitions below the threshold of armed combat; and the 
challenge of integrating military activities within the DoD and aligning 
those activities with interorganizational partners.229 
The JCIC is an essential first step in evolving military strategy in the 21st century. 
Military leaders must adopt the principles and the framework identified in the JCIC to 
evolve existing doctrine to meet the ambiguous, incremental, and asymmetric challenges 
of the gray zone.  
The U.S. Navy’s 2018 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 echoes the 
conclusion that the military must rapidly adapt to threats of the 21st century, stating it “has 
been decades since we last competed for sea control, sea lines of communication, access 
to world markets, and diplomatic partnerships. Much has changed since we last competed. 
We will adapt to this reality and respond with urgency.”230  The Design adds that the U.S. 
Navy will “aggressively compete” with revisionists states that seek to reorder the world in 
their image, and that competition will take place in a world where disputes rarely rise to 
conflict.231 The JCIC and the Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0 are 
affirmations that senior military leaders recognize the threat of gray zone coercion. 
However, these documents must be turned into TTPs and SOPs that give on-scene 
commanders the necessary authority to respond with the requisite force to prevent China’s 
maritime militias from impeding U.S. and partner-nation operations in the South China 
Sea. 
                                                 
229 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Concept of 
Integrated Campaigning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), V. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joint_concept_integrated_campaign.pdf?ver=2018-03-28-102833-257. 
230 Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime 
Superiority, Version 2.0” (Washington, DC: United States Navy, December 2018), 3. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/cno/Richardson/Resource/Design_2.0.pdf. 
231 Richardson, 3. 
89 
One key institutional shift would be to more wholly integrate U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG) with USN units. Lyle Morris asserts that “states now desire greater coast guard-
naval cooperation to address such [gray zone] actions, especially near disputed territory 
where policy-makers seek to contain the challenge using law enforcement, not military 
means.”232 Routinizing these sorts of interactions would help enable greater flexibility and 
presence in disputed areas of the maritime domain, directly challenging PRC presence. An 
example of increasing USN-USCG integration occurred in January 2019 with the 
deployment of the USCG National Security Cutter (NSC) Bertholf (WMSL-750) to the 
INDO-PACOM theater of operations to support “professional exchanges and capacity 
building with partner nations.”233 However, Morris contends that “while strategic and 
policy coordination between Navy and Coast Guards exist … the current level of tactical 
interoperability between the two services is inadequate to effectively operate within the 
gray zone environment.”234 Thus, leaders must develop the necessary organizational 
authorities that enable maritime force integration across departmental lines of separation. 
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